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A central question in many economic problems is how information about the environment affects
the interaction of decision makers. Typically, information is not symmetrically distributed
across economic agents for several reasons. For example, one agent may be the owner of a
product, while the other is willing to buy the product. Naturally, the owner has access to more
information about the product than the potential buyer. It is well-known that asymmetric
information can have drastic consequences such as leading to the breakdown of markets as
famously discussed in Akerlof (1970). Another reason for asymmetric information is learning. In
dynamic environments, players can acquire additional information on projects or objects that is
valuable to them. However, learning is not necessarily symmetric because the economic agents
may have different tasks or roles in the interaction and may not observe the same information.
This thesis contains three self-contained articles, each studying the role of information on the
economic interaction in a specific environment. Chapter 3 is joint work with Stefan Weiergra¨ber,
Chapter 4 is joint work with Sinem Hidir. Chapters 2 and 4 are theoretical papers that
study dynamic environments in which players can learn about the fundamental variables that
determine the value of the interaction. Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of learning about a project’s
profitability in a principal-agent relationship with an application to the financing of projects
with uncertain quality, e.g. venture capital finance. Chapter 4 considers a dynamic team work
problem in which the ability of a team member is his private information but learned over
time. Chapter 3 is empirical work that addresses asymmetries in the bidders’ information about
the future profitability of tracks in German short haul railway passenger service procurement
auctions.
Chapter 2. In this chapter, the underlying question is how learning about a project’s feasibility
affects the interaction of a principal, who funds the project but cannot directly observe the
agent’s actions and therefore what the agent learns, with an agent, who works on the project.
Towards this, I study a continuous-time moral hazard problem with private learning about
a project of unknown quality. There is ex ante symmetric information and full commitment
for the principal. The project generates a profit if two consecutive stages are completed. The
amount of experimentation required to complete the first stage (milestone) is informative but
not conclusive about the quality of the project. The informativeness of the milestone yields
an incentive to privately shirk in the first stage. This increases the principal’s pessimism in
the second stage and thereby induces more favorable second-stage contract terms for the agent.
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1 General Introduction
In the optimal contract, the reward for a first-stage success is decreasing in its arrival time to
prevent effort delays. The reward’s composition changes with the success time: early successes
are rewarded with long second-stage deadlines and no bonus payments in the first stage, while
later successes are rewarded with first-stage bonus payments and less continuation value from
second-stage experimentation. Allowing for agent replacement between stages, I show that the
principal wants to replace the agent in the second stage if the success arrives late.
Chapter 3. This chapter, which is joint work with Stefan Weiergra¨ber, is, in contrast to
chapters 2 and 4, an empirical project, in which we take a theoretical model to a data set on
German short haul railway passenger service auctions to estimate the effects of asymmetric
access to information of an incumbent and its competitors. Many procurement auctions involve
both private value and common value elements. Bidding firms are often asymmetric in both
dimensions. First, former state monopolists or incumbents may be better informed about
the common value, for example the revenue component of a procurement contract. Second,
incumbents and entrants may have very different cost distributions (a typical private value
component). Understanding the bidding behavior in a setting with private and common value
components and asymmetries among bidders in both dimensions is essential to evaluate auction
outcomes. We develop and estimate a structural auction model using a detailed contract-level
data set of the market for short-haul railway passenger services in Germany. This allows us to
disentangle the effects of asymmetries in the cost distribution between the incumbent and the
entrants from the effects of asymmetric information about the revenue component of a SRPS
contract. Data on gross auctions, in which firms do not face revenue risk, allow us to back out
the cost distribution for each firm. Data on net auctions, in which firms bear the revenue risk,
enable us to quantify the effect of revenue uncertainty on bidding strategies. Our results indicate
that (1) bidding behavior is indeed systematically different in gross and net auctions, (2) the
incumbent is only slightly more cost-efficient on most lines, (3) the incumbent has substantially
more information about future ticket revenues than an entrant. We use our parameter estimates
to run a series of counterfactuals. If net auctions were procured as gross auctions, we find that
(1) entrants would have bid much more aggressively than in the status quo, (2) on average, the
probability of selecting the efficient firm would increase from 64% to 75%.
Chapter 4. Chapter 4 is joint work with Sinem Hidir and studies the role of learning about a
team member’s productivity and dynamic freeriding incentives. We analyze a model of dynamic
collaboration in the presence of asymmetric information about a player’s ability. There is a
team of two working to achieve a one time success on a project, and only the ability of one
player is common knowledge (senior) while the ability of the other player (junior) is private
information. This leads to gradual pessimism of the senior about the junior being of high ability
as time passes without a success. The senior increases his effort over time in order to compensate
for the junior’s (in expectation) lower ability. This is anticipated by the junior and therefore
induces him to reduce his effort early on. We show numerically that overall effort can increase
2
when instead of adding a productive junior to the team with certainty, the junior’s ability is
random and he is unproductive with positive probability. This uncertainty reduces the freeriding
incentive of the senior.
3

2 Informative Milestones in Experimentation
2.1 Introduction
Intermediate milestones are frequently observed in principal-agent relationships where the
feasibility of the project is unknown to both parties. A fundamental reason for this is that
the performance in early stages conveys valuable information about subsequent stages to the
principal. Given this informational spillover and the agent’s ability to affect the observable
information, several questions arise. How are the agent’s incentives to exert effort affected by
the informativeness of the milestone? How does the optimal contract adapt to these incentives?
How does the role of bonus payments, deadlines and continuation contracts change with an
informative milestone?
I show that the informational spillover across the stages introduces an endogenous ratchet
effect: By privately shirking in the first stage the agent increases the principal’s pessimism in
the second stage which yields higher rents for the agent through a more favorable second-stage
contract. To prevent the delay in effort, the optimal contract rewards early successes with higher
rents. These rents are increasing in the continuation value from second-stage experimentation
because a higher continuation value amplifies the ratchet effect. In contrast to a setting with in-
dependent stages, rewarding the agent with a continuation contract is therefore costly. Thus, the
optimal contract will also use bonus payments for first-stage successes to reduce the information
rents. Moreover, if the principal has access to a new agent for the second stage, the informative
milestone gives rise to replacement of the agent if he succeeds too late in the first stage.
As an application of the setup, consider the venture capital industry. Innovative projects
involve uncertainty about their quality. They also require the effort and knowledge of experts
as well as substantial amounts of capital. As entrepreneurs rarely have the necessary funds
themselves, they contract with financial investors. One of the main funding sources for high-risk
startups is venture capital.1 The high degree of uncertainty about the project’s future prof-
itability together with the substantial size of the investment may make investors reluctant to
invest. To overcome this problem, intermediate stages, so-called milestones, are introduced to
gather information about the project’s quality at a reduced cost. A typical example for such a
milestone is the development of a prototype. One important feature of prototypes is that they
are a tool to learn about the prospects of the project.
1Gornall and Strebulaev (2015) show that 42% of independent U.S. public firms founded after 1974 are
venture-capital backed. Notably, 85% of the R&D expenditures of these firms stem from venture-capital backed
firms.
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Staging of venture capital contracts is a well-documented feature: Kaplan and Stroemberg
(2004) show that 72.8% of contracts in their sample involve staging. It has been argued that
staging helps in mitigating agency costs (see for example, Gompers (1995), Neher (1999) or
Cumming (2012)). However, the literature is surprisingly silent about learning and the informa-
tional value of milestones. I show that introducing informational content of early stages has
important consequences for the incentives of the startup as well as the design of the optimal
contract.
I develop and study a continuous-time principal-agent bandit experimentation model with an
informative milestone. A project of uncertain quality has to complete each of two sequential
stages to realize its benefits. Any success is immediately and publicly observed. The intensity
rate of obtaining a breakthrough for a given level of effort in the first stage stage is higher
for a good than for a bad project. Hence, the total effort required until the first success is
informative but not conclusive about the project’s quality.2 As effort is costly and unobserved,
this is a dynamic moral hazard problem with private learning. I solve for the full-commitment
profit-maximizing contract that conditions on the publicly observable success times. I allow for
arbitrary payment rules subject to limited liability.
The optimal contract will feature a deadline for each of the stages because if the principal
becomes too pessimistic she will terminate the project. Moreover, it is without loss of generality
to focus on bonus contracts that have payments to the agent only at success times. Hence, there
are at most two payments to the agent. First-stage bonus payments are short-term incentives
that do not condition on the long-run success of the project and their value is independent of
the current belief. However, the second-stage bonus payment and deadline together induce an
expected value for the agent that depends on the belief about the project’s quality at the begin-
ning of the second stage which is determined by the first-stage performance. This continuation
value can be interpreted as the value of equity given to the agent after the first success.
The informational spillover across the stages implies that effort choices in the first stage do
not only affect the belief about the project in the current stage but also the initial belief of
the second stage. If more effort is exerted until the first success is obtained, players are more
pessimistic in the second stage. Deviations from the expected effort path persistently divert the
agent’s private belief from the principal’s belief. Therefore, he holds a different belief after the
first success than the principal. This is the key novelty of this paper and the underlying reason
for the main results. The effect of a deviation from the expected effort path on the belief in the
current stage gives rise to procrastination rents, while the effect of a deviation on the belief in
the following stage gives rise to a novel rent that I call informativeness rents.
First, consider the interaction of moral hazard and private learning in the current stage. The
agent’s incentives are driven by his private belief about the success probability: the reward has
to be chosen such that the agent is at least compensated with an expected utility that outweighs
the cost of effort. However, the agent has the ability to privately shirk and divert the beliefs
2Hence, the stochastic process of the breakthrough in the first stage is the same as, for example, in Keller and
Rady (2010), while the stochastic process for a breakthrough in the second stage is the same as, for example, in
Keller et al. (2005).
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because the principal cannot distinguish whether the absence of a success was due to bad luck
or due to a deviation. Therefore, the principal becomes overly pessimistic and the reward is
misspecified: if the principal is overly pessimistic she believes that she has to pay a higher reward
to the agent. Hence, the agent has an incentive to delay effort if the contract does not account
for private learning about the current stage. This effect is present in both stages and the agent
has to be granted procrastination rents to prevent belief manipulation about the current stage.
Second, consider the interaction of moral hazard and private learning in the first stage about
the second stage. By privately shirking in the first stage the agent induces the principal to be
overly pessimistic in the second stage. A low second-stage belief of the principal implies that
the continuation contract has to promise the agent a high bonus if he succeeds in the second
stage: the less likely she thinks it is to obtain a success, the higher this bonus payment must be
upon obtaining the second success to make the agent willing to exert effort. Hence, conditional
on reaching the second stage, the agent wants the principal to be pessimistic in the second stage
to enjoy higher payments upon second-stage success.
The intuition for the agent’s incentive to manipulate the principal’s belief can be related to
the ratchet effect :3 the agent wants the principal to be sufficiently optimistic to continue the
project; however, conditional on continuation he wants the principal to be pessimistic to be
granted a high bonus after the second success.
This effect is neither present with independent stages nor in a one-stage setting. With
independent stages, the belief at the beginning of the second stage is exogenously given and
the agent cannot affect this by off-path effort choices in the first stage. In a one-stage setting,
the interaction ends after the first success. To prevent the delay in effort, the principal has to
reward early successes with higher rents than later successes. I call these rents informativeness
rents as they only arise due to the informativeness of the milestone. The rate at which the total
reward for the first success decreases is exactly the gain in value of the private information at
the beginning of the second stage; that is, the value of holding a marginally more optimistic
belief than the principal in the second stage. While the procrastination rents prevent deviations
that directly affect the level of the reward for a success in the current stage, the informativeness
rents prevent deviations that alter the assessment of the second-stage contract through the
persistence of the agent’s private information into the second stage.
Procrastination rents are unaffected by the way in which the reward is delivered to the agent.
However, the informativeness rent has to be provided because the agent can gain from the per-
sistence in his private information in the continuation contract. I show that the informativeness
rent is increasing in the on-path value of the continuation contract. The higher is the value to
be delivered in the second stage, the higher is the value of being more optimistic in the second
stage. Therefore, the principal faces a tradeoff when choosing how to deliver the first-stage
reward. The principal would like to incentivize the agent to work until an extended deadline
in the second stage: due to the procrastination rents, experimentation stops inefficiently early
in the second stage. By extending the deadline, additional overall surplus is generated which
makes continuation contracts an attractive reward mechanism.
3See, for example, Laffont and Tirole (1988) or, more recently, Bhaskar (2014).
7
2 Informative Milestones in Experimentation
The downside of delivering utility through more valuable continuation contracts is that these
increase the informativeness rents. In particular, at all times prior to a particular success time,
the agent’s incentive to delay effort increases if additional utility is delivered through a contin-
uation contract at that success time because it increases the value of the private information.
Hence, the cost of using the long-term reward continuation contract is increasing in the success
time.
In the optimal contract, early successes are rewarded with continuation contracts only, imple-
mented through long second-stage deadlines, because the gain of extending the deadline is large
while the cost is very low. As time elapses without a breakthrough, the composition changes
such that the reward consists of an increasing share of bonus payments and less of a continuation
contract to reduce the informativeness rents for all earlier successes.
It is worthwile to note that I can use backward induction in this setting with full commitment.
The reason is that reducing deviation incentives in the first stage through the choice of and
maximizing profits with a second-stage contract are aligned. Delivering utility with extended
deadlines in the second stage reduces the deviation incentives in the first stage compared to the
alternative of using higher second-stage bonus payments. Higher bonus payments in the second
stage are indeed the reason why the agent is willing to delay effort in the first stage. Moreover,
extending deadlines increases the probability of succeeding in the second stage and therefore
maximizes the principal’s profits subject to the promised utility of the agent.
In an extension, I consider the possibility of replacing the agent after the first stage. In
contrast to other models of experimentation or staged financing, my model can rationalize
managerial turnover in young startup firms.4 Hannan et al. (1996) show that 40% of CEOs are
replaced within the first 40 months of a startup. I show that the presence of the informativeness
rent gives rise to turnover: The principal always wants to introduce two deadlines for the first
stage in the present setting: (i) if the agent succeeds before the first deadline, he is rewarded
with a continuation contract, (ii) if the agent succeeds after the first and before the second
deadline, he receives a payment and is replaced by a new agent in the second stage, (iii) if the
agent has not obtained a success before the second deadline, the project is terminated. To see
why replacement is optimal, recall that the agent receives the informativeness rent only if he is
working on the second stage. Hence, if the agent is replaced when he succeeds after a certain
deadline he can be incentivized at a lower cost in the first stage. This also implies that the agent
receives lower rents in the continuation region because delaying effort becomes less attractive
as the replacement deadline approaches. Thus, the principal faces a tradeoff between the cost
of more expensively rewarding agents in the replacement region with a bonus payment instead
of a continuation contract and the benefit of reduced informativeness rents. I show that the
principal always prefers to have both, a replacement and a continuation region, in the optimal
contract if there is an agency conflict in the first stage.
I extend the analysis to allow for the principal’s choice of informativeness and endogenous
staging. Assuming that the principal can choose the intensity rate of the first stage and that
4Garrett and Pavan (2012) provide a dynamic model of managerial turnover. However, they assume ex ante
asymmetric information and that the productivity of the agent is changing.
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the second stage vanishes as the first stage becomes fully informative, I show that the optimal
two-stage contract converges to the optimal one-stage contract. The principal faces a non-trivial
tradeoff in the staging decision: when introducing an informative milestone, the principal gains
from the additional information provided in the first stage and can condition the second-stage
funding and contract on the first stage outcome. However, introducing an informative milestone
generates the informativeness rents. Numerically, I show that the staging decision depends
on parameter values and it cannot be argued that one mode dominates the other generically.
However, I find that staging takes place more likely if the initial success probability is low;
that is, when the value of additional information is relatively high. In particular, I find that
introducing an informative milestone can facilitate funding for projects with low initial success
probabilities that would not receive funding as a one-stage project.
The insights I derive can be applied in several other contexts. For example, it could describe
the interaction of a CEO with the leader of the research department to work on a risky and
expensive project. Alternatively, there could be uncertainty about the worker’s type instead
of the project’s quality. In this case, an employer could offer a contract with a probationary
period in which a first signal about the employee’s competence can be obtained. The result on
the composition of an agent’s reward conditional on the performance may also give another
perspective on regulating CEO compensation.
My analysis generates several empirical predictions that can be of interest in different ap-
plications: (i) The composition of the agent’s compensation changes with performance. In
particular, if performance gets worse, the total reward is lower and consists of relatively more
short-term than long-term rewards. For example, a well-performing CEO is rewarded with
stock options that are tied to future performance. A CEO that performs worse is rewarded
with bonus payments and less with stock options. The total worth of the reward is higher for
the well-performing CEO. (ii) Deadlines are relatively more responsive to early performance
while final-stage bonus payments are less responsive to early performance compared to a setting
without informativeness rents. (iii) Early-stage deadlines are relatively short if there is a learning
spillover to future stages. (iv) Even successful agents may be replaced if they do not perform
sufficiently well although the project is continued and the agent known to be able to complete
future tasks. (v) Staging occurs more frequently if the initial risk is high.
Short early-stage deadlines may explain the observation of high failure rates of startups.
Shikhar Gosh is cited in The Wall Street Journal that 35% of startups survive to the age of
10 years. High failure rates are not necessarily due to high risk only. If deadlines are used by
the investors and agency conflicts induce deadlines to be inefficiently short, too many startups
fail and too few innovations are obtained in a society. Concerning the replacement of successful
agents, Noam Wasserman notes in a Harvard Business Review article that: ”[o]thers invest in a
start-up only when they‘re confident the founder has the skills to lead it in the long term. Even
these firms, though, have to replace as many as a quarter of the founder-CEOs in the companies
they fund.” Hence, replacement also occurs even though there is no doubt about the agent’s
qualification to succeed with the project. Although empirical implication (v) about staging and
initial risk is only a numerical outcome, it is fairly intuitive and empirical evidence has been
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found in Bienz and Hirsch (2011).
Related Literature. My paper contributes to the growing literature on principal-agent models
with ex ante symmetric uncertainty about a project’s feasibility. Most of the early work focuses
on the case where one success suffices to complete the project and in the absence of a success
players become pessimistic about the project’s quality; see for example, Bergemann and Hege
(1998; 2006), Halac et al. (2016), Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2013). These models apply the
exponential bandit model of Keller et al. (2005) in which one success is fully informative about
the project’s quality. By contrast, I assume that there may be a first stage that is informative
but not conclusive about the quality of the project and a second breakthrough is required
to complete the project. First, it allows to assess the impact of staging that is widely used
in contracting relationships when there is uncertainty about the project’s value. I show that
introducing an additional and informative stage can facilitate funding of projects that would
not be undertaken if they were forced to involve only a single stage. Seond, it allows for more
flexibility in the learning process compared to the one-stage experimentation literature; during
the course of the project it may be that players become more optimistic instead of increasingly
pessimistic over time.
To the best of my knowledge, there are three papers that consider staged projects which are
closely related. First, Moroni (2016) considers a principal contracting with several agents on a
project that requires multiple breakthroughs to yield the final payoff. She shows that agents
have an additional free-riding incentive because another agent may start a subsequent stage.
Because she assumes that early stages carry no information about later stages, staging has no
informational value and therefore, there is no informativeness rent present. If there is only one
agent, her analysis may serve as a benchmark to the present paper without learning across
stages and with a fixed second-stage belief. In that case the agent would be incentivized with
a constant continuation value in the first and a constant bonus payment in the second stage.
Hence, the continuation contract was independent of the first-stage performance and there would
be no replacement of the agent.
Second, Green and Taylor (2016) and Hu (2014) study dynamic moral hazard problems in which
the agent also has to obtain two success. However, the quality of the project is known to be good
but the agent has the ability to divert the flow funding of the principal. In their case deadlines
arise to prevent the agent from diverting cash. Early successes also have to be rewarded with
higher continuation values. However, the reason is fundamentally different: In both, Green and
Taylor (2016), Hu (2014), the agent has a direct benefit from delaying effort which is the flow
benefit from diverting the cash. In my paper, delaying effort creates an informational advantage
because it persistently drives a wedge between the principal’s and the agent’s belief about the
project’s value. If the project was known to be good, the principal could achieve the first best
in my model. While Green and Taylor (2016) focus on the role of communication and private
observability of progress, they do not consider general payment schemes and restrict attention
to contracts that only pay the agent after a final success.
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This paper also relates to the ongoing discussion on staged contracts. Examples of this
literature are, among others, Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Neher (1999), Cuny and Talmor
(2005) and Booth et al. (2004). These papers discuss the value of staging contracts to mitigate
agency conflicts through the threat of termination and to reduce the hold-up problem. However,
these papers do not consider the possibly uncertain feasibility of the project about which the
agent can privately learn by exercising effort. While this may be realistic in some cases, learning
plays an important role in the financing of innovation. Therefore, I take a different perspective
and study the informational value of staging if the project’s feasibility is unknown. Pindyck
(1993) also discusses the informational value of early investments that can reduce uncertainty over
later costs. I show that if learning is private, then there is a tradeoff of introducing informative
milestones: On the one hand, an informative milestone can be beneficial because a signal can
be generated at a lower cost. On the other hand, private learning of the agent gives rise to
an additional agency rent due to the possibility to manipulate the principal’s belief. To my
knowledge, this is the first paper to address this potential drawback of informative milestones.
Bhaskar (2014) considers a related two-period model with learning about a project’s difficulty
but without commitment. In the first period, a signal is generated that depends on the agent’s
effort and the project’s type. Similar to the present paper, he shows that the agent has an
incentive to manipulate the principal’s belief such that he obtains higher payoffs in the second
period. Different to his paper, I study the interplay between learning and dynamic moral
hazard. Thereby, I can shed light on the use of different reward instruments, deadlines and
bonus payments, to incentivize the agent.
On a more abstract level, this paper is related to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016) who also study
a model where agent’s private deviations affect the assessment of the promised continuation
value. In their model, the principal also has to pay an additional information rent to prevent
the agent’s deviation to get an informational advantage over the principal. The model differs
in the underlying learning process: DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016) study a Brownian model
in which informative outputs are produced continuously, while I assume that news arrive at
exponentially distributed times. While their model is suitable to analyze an unknown profitability
of a continuously producing firm in which news arrive continuously, my model highlights the
aspects of an innovative project in which drastic news arrive at random times. This focus allows
me to study staged contracts and the role of deadlines and bonus payments. Prat and Jovanovic
(2014) consider a model similar to DeMarzo and Sannikov (2016) with a risk averse agent and a
constant quality. As information arrives continuously in their model, early deviations have a
stronger impact on the belief diversion than later deviations.
2.2 Model
There is an agent (entrepreneur, he) with access to a project of unknown quality that has
to complete two sequential stages, i ∈ {1, 2}. The agent has no wealth and contracts with a
principal (e.g. a venture capitalist, she) to receive the necessary funds, fi, that are required to
11
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work on stage i. After the completion of the final stage the project immediately generates a
value pi to the principal. The project can be either good or bad, ω ∈ {g, b}. Only a good project
can complete both stages; however, a bad project may complete the first stage. The agent has
to undergo experimentation to learn about the quality of the project and to advance it towards
completion. Experimentation is modeled as a two-armed bandit in continuous time, t ∈ [0,∞).
The agent chooses in time interval [t, t+ dt) how much effort to exert, i.e., chooses ai,t ∈ [0, 1],
which comes at cost ai,tc.
A project of quality ω generates a success in stage i with probability λωi ai,tdt if effort ai,t has
been exerted in time interval [t, t + dt). I assume that the intensity rate of a good project is
higher than the intensity of a bad project, λgi > λ
b
i . Moreover, only a good project can succeed
in the second stage, i.e., λg2 > λ
b
2 = 0.
5 The principal and the agent hold a common initial belief
p0 ∈ (0, 1) that the project is of good quality. Let pi,t({ai,s}0≤s<t) denote the belief that the
project is of good quality at time t in stage i given effort path {ai,s}0≤s<t.
Breakthroughs are immediately publicly observed. The public history at time t, ht ∈ Ht,
consists of the success times, i.e., {τi}i∈{1,2} with τi ∈ {∅ ∪ R+} where the emptyset refers to
the case that no success in stage i has been obtained yet. Note that if I did assume that the
success is verifiable but not publicly observable, the most profitable deviation of an agent could
be to exert effort, but hide a potential success. However, I show in an extension that under
the optimal contract with public observability of successes, the agent would have no incentive
to hide a success even if he could do so. Denote by htα ∈ Htα the private history of the agent
at time t that consists of the public history as well as the agent’s effort choices in each of the
stages, {ai,t}0≤s<t. The history of past effort choices matters only through its aggregation in
each stage Ai,t =
∫ t
0 ai,tdt as this determines the agent’s belief. Hence, I can restrict attention
to private histories of the form Htα ∈ {Ht × {∅ ∪ [0, t]} × {∅ ∪ [0, t]}}. The agent’s strategy is
therefore a measurable map from calendar time and his private history into the unit interval,
ai,t(h
t
α) : R+ ×Htα → [0, 1]. To simplify notation, I drop the explicit dependence on the history
and keep only the time index t.
The principal offers the agent a profit-maximizing payment process conditioning on the public
history to which she is fully committed from time zero on. I restrict attention to deterministic
contracts. A payment process consists of a flow payment, wf (h
t), and a lump-sum payment,
wl(h
t) at every history ht ∈ Ht. In the Appendix, I show that it is without loss of generality to
restrict attention to bonus contracts; that is, to contracts that have payments only at time zero,
and the success times. Denote by H˜t the subset of public histories at time t with a breakthrough
at time t. Hence, a bonus contract maps for every history ht ∈ H˜t a bonus payment b(ht) ∈ R to
the agent and chooses a payment b0 at time zero. To simplify notation, I drop the dependence
on the history of the bonus payment and denote a bonus payment in stage i given the history ht
as bi,t. No payments take place at histories h
t 6∈ {H˜t ∪H0}. I assume that the agent is subject
to limited liability. Hence, at every history ht the agent’s bonus payment is nonnegative. Note
5The results would not change qualitatively if a bad project could also succeed in the second stage when a
bad project’s success probability in the second stage is sufficiently low that it would not be funded if it was known
to be of bad quality.
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that without limited liability the principal could obtain the first-best by having the agent make
a payment equal to the expected value of the project at time zero.
For expositional purposes and to help building intuition, I consider in the main text that
discounting is in the limit r = 0. All results remain qualitatively unchanged with a common and
positive but sufficiently small discount rate r > 0. All proofs are carried out with r > 0 in the
Appendix.6
Given a terminal history h with success times {τi}i∈{1,2} and bonus payments bi,t, the principal’s
payoff is given by
e−rτ2 (pi − b2,τ2)− e−rτ1b1,τ1 .








The agent’s outside option is normalized to zero.
2.2.1 Learning
A breakthrough is informative but not conclusive. After a success at time τ in stage 1 the belief
jumps according to Bayes’ rule to7
p2,0(A1,τ ) =
λgi p1,τ (A1,τ )
λgi p1,τ (A1,τ ) + λ
b
i(1− p1,τ (A1,τ ))
.
Hence, the less effort has been exerted until a success is achieved, the higher is the upward jump
of the belief after a success. When effort is exerted but no breakthrough is observed the agent
becomes more pessimistic about project quality as λgi > λ
b
i . The belief follows the differential
equation8
dpi,t = −pi,t(1− pi,t)∆λiat
where ∆λi ≡ λgi − λbi and initial condition p1,0 = p0 and p2,0 = p2,0(A1,τ ) as defined above.
Hence, the belief drifts downwards if the agent exerts effort. To simplify notation, denote
λg1 = λ
g, λb1 = λ
b and λg2 = λ while λ
b
2 = 0 by assumption. λ
g > λb implies that the absence of a
6To make the analysis of the informative milestone interesting, I assume that discounting is sufficiently small.
Strategic incentives in the present setting are driven by the possibility to delay effort. However, if the agent
discounts the future more (if r becomes large), the agent becomes less strategic. In the limit case of a myopic
agent, the efficient outcome is obtained. Assuming r = 0 throughout introduces a technical difficulty in the proof
that full effort will be implemente by the principal. This can be circumvented by assuming a strictly positive
discount rate.
7Note that to be precise, p1,τ in this equation is p1,τ−, i.e., the left-limit of the belief held at τ . For almost all
t, that is whenever no success occurs, p1,t− = p1,t. This is to say that the action at t cannot condition on the
arrival of a success at t.
8This follows from calculating the belief at t+ dt via Bayes’ rule and taking the limit dt→ 0.
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Start of Second stageA1,t = 0A1,t = 0
Figure 2.1: Belief path depending on total amount of effort up to success.
The red line plots the belief path if more effort is required to obtain the first breakthrough,
while the green line plots belief path obtains the first breakthrough if less effort is required.
breakthrough makes players more pessimistic about the state of the project.
Note that beliefs do depend on the total effort that has been exerted in each of the stages,
but not on how it was distributed over time. Hence, the higher is total effort until t, the lower is
the belief about the project quality at t. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Learning is private
because the agent’s effort choices are unobserved by the principal. However, the principal holds
a belief about the agent’s effort. If the agent’s choices coincide with the principal’s belief about
these, their beliefs about the project’s quality coincide. Otherwise, if the agent has exerted less
(more) effort than expected by the principal, the principal is more pessimistic (optimistic) than
the agent.
2.3 First-Best Benchmark
As a benchmark consider a social planner that maximizes the sum of payoffs. This optimization
is solved by backward induction through the stages. Hence, consider the second stage and
assume that the first stage was completed at τ1. The initial belief at the beginning of the second
stage is therefore p2,0(A1,τ1) with A1,τ1 =
∫ τ1
0 a1,tdt. Note first that the probability of reaching




9To ease notation, assume that the clock is restarted when the second stage is reached.
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and the instantaneous success probability by
p2,t(A1,τ1)λa2,tdt








0 p2,s(A1,τ1 )λa2,sdsa2,t (p2,t(A1,τ1)λpi − c) dt.
This gives as optimal choice a2,t = 1 for all t such that p2,t(A1,τ1)λa2,tpi ≥ c and a2,t = 0















This optimal deadline generates value
Π2(A1,τ1) =
∫ τ1+TFB2 (A1,τ1 )
τ1
e
− ∫ tτ1 p2,s(A1,τ1 )λds (p2,t(A1,τ1)λpi − c) dt− f2









g + (1− p1,t)λb)Π2(A1,t)− c
)
dt− f1.
The optimal effort policy has a1,t = 1 if (p1,tλ
g+(1−p1,t)λb)Π2(A1,t) ≥ c2 and a1,t = 0 otherwise.
Note that not only does the probability of succeeding in the first stage decrease in the absence
of a success but also the continuation value of reaching the next stage. Because increasing
pessimism in the first stage induces also higher pessimism in the second stage, the initial belief
of the second stage is lower if more effort was required to reach that stage. This follows from
the logic that bad quality projects require more effort to successfully complete the first stage.
As a consequence, the better the project performed in the first stage, the higher is the optimal
amount of total experimentation in the second stage. Earlier successes are better news about the
project and therefore generate more optimisim about its quality. The first-best experimentation
policy therefore uses the first-stage performance to adjust the optimal amount of experimentation
in the second stage.
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2.4 Derivation of the Optimal Contract
In this section, I derive the optimal contract via backward induction. That is, I first derive
the continuation contract for the second stage. Taking this continuation contract as given, I
move to the first stage and study the agent’s incentives and solve for the optimal contract.
To apply backward induction, I need to ensure that the principal cannot improve upon the
optimal continuation contract by committing to a suboptimal continuation contract that reduces
deviation incentives in the first stage. I show that the optimal continuation contract subject to
promise keeping is indeed the contract that gives the least incentives to deviate which allows me
to use backward induction.
2.4.1 Second-Stage Continuation Contract
I first study the optimal continuation contract after a first-stage success. I proceed in several steps.
First, I define the principal’s optimization problem. Second, I derive the incentive-compatible
bonus payment process that implements any desired effort path. Third, I derive the optimal
continuation contract. Finally, I consider the agent’s value after a deviation in the first stage.
The principal enters this stage with a belief p2,0(Aˆ1,τ1) that depends on her belief about
the total effort that has been exerted up to the success time τ1 in the first stage, where
Aˆ1,τ1 ≡
∫ τ1
0 aˆ1,tdt. The principal can only condition on this belief as she can condition on the
public history which consists of the success times only. In this subsection, I first assume that the
agent has not deviated in the first stage implying that the belief held by principal and agent at
the beginning of the stage coincide. To induce the desired effort, the contract has to satisfy the
agent’s incentive-compatibility condition. Hence, the principal solves the following optimization
problem10






0 p2,s(Aˆ1,τ1 )λa2,sdsa2,tp2,t(Aˆ1,τ1)λ(pi − b2,t(τ1))dt(OBJ2)












0 p2,s(Aˆ1,τ1 )λa˜2,sdsa˜2,t(p2,t(Aˆ1,τ1)λb2,t(τ1)− c)dt(PK)
where v(Aˆ1,τ1) is the utility the agent is promised from the first stage. Hence, condition PK
means that the agent’s utility from the second-stage contract has to equal to v(Aˆ1,τ1). Note
that it depends on the first stage whether the promise-keeping constraint has to hold with
equality or inequality. It may be optimal to commit to a value less than the desired level if this
reduces first-stage information rents. This will be discussed in the analysis of the first stage.
The principal maximizes her payoff by choosing an effort path {a2,t}t≥0 she wants to induce.
10Note that deadlines are always implemented by the bonus dropping to zero at the desired point in time.
Also, note that it is without loss to restart the time variable at the beginning of the second stage. Hence, I use for
the second stage the interval [0, T2] instead of [τ1, τ1 + T2].
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For the agent to follow that recommendation the bonus payment has to be chosen such that the
agent finds it indeed optimal to choose that effort path. That is, b2,t(Aˆ1,τ1) has to satisfy IC2 as
well.
Incentive Compatibility. I first study the agent’s effort choice and derive the incentive-
compatible second-stage bonus payment that induces effort of the agent up to a deadline.
The agent’s effort choices in the second stage have two effects. First, effort is required to obtain
a success at the current instant. Second, effort determines the learning; if more effort has been
exerted without a success, the more pessimistic is the agent. Whenever the agent has followed
the principal’s effort recommendations, their beliefs coincide. However, by deviating from the
recommended effort path, the agent can divert his private belief from the principal’s belief. In
this case, the bonus payment is tailored to the belief the principal holds. This induces a dynamic
agency rent. To build intuition, consider a dynamic programming heuristic similar to Bonatti
and Ho¨rner (2011). Recall that only a good project can succeed and conditional on a success
the value of the project, pi realizes and the agent receives bonus b2,t.
Vt = (1− e−a2,tp2,tλdt)b2,t − ca2,tdt+ e−a2,tp2,tλdtVt+dt
Using the analogous approximation for Vt+dt, approximating the exponentials with a second-order









By shifting effort from today to tomorrow, the agent loses the marginal payoff from effort
today, p2,tλb2,t, but gains in return the marginal benefit of effort, p2,tλb2,t+dt. If the principal
were to use an increasing bonus process, the agent had an incentive to delay effort; this induces
a procrastination rent. If the principal wants to make the agent indifferent between all effort
levels, incentive compatibility implies b˙2,t = 0. If the bonus process were decreasing, the agent
preferred to frontload effort.
Lemma 2.1. The time-independent profit-sharing rule b2,t(A1,τ1) = b2(A1,τ1) that makes the






induces the agent to exert full effort for all t ∈ [τ1, τ1 + T2(Aτ1)]. For t > τ1 + T2(Aτ1),
b2(A1,τ1) = 0.
Note that this bonus payment depends on the total effort that has been required in the first
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stage. This, as a consequence of the informativeness of the first stage, affects the continuation
contract because it determines the belief about the project quality in the second. The bonus
chosen by the principal depends on her belief about the effort choices of the agent, i.e., on Aˆ1,τ1 .
However, for now, I assume that the agent has not deviated in the first stage and therefore
Aˆ1,τ1 = A1,τ1 . With positive discounting, a delay in effort were less attractive and the principal
could save on some procrastination rents. The bonus payment was slightly increasing; however,
the intuition for the incentives to delay effort were unaltered.
Principal’s Optimization. Next, I study the principal’s preferred contract subject to the
incentive-compatibility and promise-keeping constraints. Because the absence of a success is bad
news and the principal as well as the agent become increasingly pessimistic, she will terminate
experimentation in finite time. It will turn out that the principal frontloads effort in the second
stage. That is, she wants to induce a2,t = 1 for all times up to a deadline. Hence, the problem
boils down to determining a maximum level of total effort that she wants to induce in the second
stage. Because she wants to frontload experimentation and the effort level is at its maximum,
total experimentation on path coincides with calendar time, A2,t = t.
Recall that incentive compatibility induces a weakly decreasing bonus process. Moreover,
promise-keeping requires that the agent’s expected utility in the second stage is at least as
high as the promise from the first stage, v(A1,τ1). If the promise-keeping constraint is binding,
the principal has to choose how to deliver additional utility to the agent. She can either
pay higher bonuses for a success or she can extend the deadline and thereby increase the
probability of obtaining the bonus. It is optimal for the principal to deliver additional utility
by incentivizing agents to work until extended deadlines. To see why this is optimal, note that
the experimentation deadline in the second stage will be distorted downwards from the efficient
level derived in Section 2.3 due to the procrastination rents. Having the agent exert more effort
before terminating experimentation increases the total surplus as well as the agent’s expected
utility generated in the second stage. Therefore, the principal chooses the contract such that
the agent receives the promised utility at the highest total surplus. The level of the bonuses is







If a longer deadline is chosen, the agent is more pessimistic at the deadline and therefore a
higher bonus is required to incentivize him to exert effort. The agent’s value of a contract with
constant bonus process and deadline T2 is given by







I denote the outcome of a maximization of the principal without promise-keeping constraint by
second-best contract. The corresponding deadline is denoted by TSB2 (A1,τ1) and the corresponding
utility by v(TSB2 (A1,τ1)). Note that it may be optimal to commit to a continuation utility that
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is lower than the second-best utility in the first stage to reduce deviation incentives. When this
will occur, will be discussed in the following subsection.
Proposition 2.1. The principal-optimal second-stage contract given first-stage success time τ1,
corresponding total effort in the first stage A1,τ1 and agent’s promised utility v(A1,τ1) is given by
T2(A1,τ1) =
TSB2 (A1,τ1) , if v(TSB2 (A1,τ1)) ≥ v(A1,τ1)T2(A1,τ1 , v(A1,τ1)) , if v(TSB2 (A1,τ1)) < v(A1,τ1)
or if the principal commits to providing value less than the second-best by
T2(A1,τ1) = T2(A1,τ1 , v(A1,τ1)), for all v(A1,τ1)
where T2(A1,τ1 , v(A1,τ1)) is defined as the solution, T , to






which is given by11

































One important feature of the optimal second-stage continuation contract is that it uses
deadlines as the main instrument to deliver utility to the agent: given a deadline, the principal
always uses the lowest possible bonus payment that incentivizes the agent to exert effort until
that deadline. The underlying reason is that extending deadlines reduces inefficiencies in the
total amount of experimentation in the second stage and therefore increases the overall surplus.
In addition, by rewarding with extended deadlines, the bonus payment is as low as possible
given the promise-keeping condition. Hence, generating the maximum surplus and keeping
the bonus payment as low as possible while keeping the promise from the first stage are both
obtained through extended deadlines. This observation will lateron lead to the conclusion that
this contract is not only profit-maximizing in the second stage but also the contract that yields
the lowest incentives to deviate in the first stage.
11W−1(x) denotes the negative branch of the Lambert-W-function.
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The main comparative statics that are relevant for the analysis of the first stage are summarized
in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1 (Comparative Statics of the Continuation Contract.).
The bonus and the deadline in the second stage are (weakly) increasing in the promised utility
for a given initial second-stage belief.
The bonus in the second stage is increasing and the deadline decreasing in the initial second-stage
belief for a given level of promised utility.
That bonus and deadline are weakly increasing in the promised utility follows from the way the
principal provides the agent with additional utility: she extends the deadline and to incentivize
the agent to exert effort until the new deadline she has to promise a higher bonus payment
conditional on success. The deadline is decreasing in the initial belief because for every deadline,
the principal has to provide the agent with higher bonuses to incentivize him. However, she
does not want to reduce the deadline too much as this also reduces the probability of obtaining
the final breakthrough.
Agent’s Continuation Value after a First-Stage Deviation. To study the agent’s incentives
in the first stage I need to evaluate his continuation payoff after a deviation in the first
stage. An agent could deviate by making effort choices that are different from the principal’s
recommendation. Off-path effort choices have no direct benefit but divert the agent’s from the
principal’s belief. Due to the informativeness of the milestone and the resulting persistence of
the private information the deviation has two consequences. First, it affects the agent’s belief in
the first stage. Second, it affects the initial belief of the second stage because the required effort
in the first stage is informative about project quality. If the agent has exerted less effort in the
first stage than the principal believes he has, he is more optimistic about the project’s quality
than the principal. Therefore, the agent will value the continuation contract differently than the
principal believes he does. The value of a continuation contract given that the principal beliefs
the exerted effort is Aˆ1,τ1 while the true exerted effort is A1,τ1 is given by











It is straightforward to show that the agent’s value is decreasing in A1,t; that is, for every
continuation contract he prefers to hold a higher belief than the principal. This already
foreshadows that the agent has an incentive in the first stage to shirk in order to become more
optimistic than the principal and thereby increase his continuation payoff. I will lateron show
that the contract derived in this section is also the contract that yields the smallest incentive to
deviate to the agent given the promised utility from the first stage.
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2.4.2 First-Stage Analysis
Given the analysis of the second stage, I now move to the first stage. I analyze the agent’s
incentives to exert effort first and then study the principal’s optimal contract. To incentivize
the agent to work in the first stage the principal has to promise a reward in case of a success.
As the first stage is followed by the second stage, the principal can use the experimentation
assignment in the second stage as a reward instrument. However, the principal can also use
a bonus payment to reward the agent for a first-stage success that is independent of future
performance. The total reward of the agent consists of both, the bonus payment and the value
of the continuation contract
w(τ1) = b1,τ1 + v(τ1).
To understand the agent’s incentives in the first stage it is important to note that, in contrast
to settings with independent stages, an off-path effort choice has two consequences. First, it
diverts the agent’s from the principal’s belief in the first stage as it is the case in the second
stage. Second, it also diverts the initial belief at the beginning of the second stage because the
effort required to complete the first stage is informative about the project quality.
To see the impact of the latter on the agent’s incentives, consider the implementation of the
second-stage contract: the principal chooses the continuation contract such that it delivers in
expectation the promised utility from the first stage to the agent. This expectation is calculated
based on the principal’s belief about the project quality. By first-stage deviations the agent can
divert his private belief from the principal’s in the second stage. This will affect the agent’s true
expected value of the continuation contract: recall the off-path value of the agent from equation
(2.3). The gain of holding a marginally more optimistic belief is














How this affects the agent’s incentives can again be seen in a dynamic programming heuristic:
Vt = (1− e−a1,t(p1,tλg+(1−p1,t)λb)dt)wt − ca1,tdt+ e−a1,t(p1,tλg+(1−p1,t)λb)dtVt+dt
Using the analogous approximation for Vt+dt, approximating the exponentials with a second-order

















g + (1− p1,t)λb
)
.
This heuristic mirrors the two effects of a deviation: first, a delay in effort affects the level of
the total reward, wt, because the agent can divert the belief in the current stage. Second, the
delay in effort also affects the agent’s belief in the second stage and thereby the assessment of
the continuation contract. Becoming more optimistic than the principal increases the value of a
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continuation contract that is tailored to a more pessimistic agent. Therefore, the persistence in
the private information across stages creates an endogenously arising ratchet effect : the agent
wants the principal to think that the success probability in the second stage is low because in that
case the principal believes that she has to promise high payments conditional on second-stage
success to incentivize the agent.
So far, I have assumed that the second-stage contract is implemented as derived in the previous
section. By full commitment this is not necessarily the case because it could be better for the
principal to commit to a suboptimal second-stage contract that reduces the deviation incentives
in the first stage. The following lemma shows that the optimal second-stage contract is the
implementation of the promised utility from the first stage that induces the lowest incentive to
deviate allowing me to use backward induction.
Lemma 2.2. The continuation contract derived in Proposition 2.1 induces the lowest incentives
to deviate in the first stage while satisfying the promise-keeping condition.
Intuitively, this result holds because the contract in Proposition 2.1 is the implementation
with the lowest bonus payment after a second-stage success. The ratchet effect in the first
stage arises because by making the principal more pessimistic the agent is promised a higher
bonus conditional on success in the second stage. This effect is increasing in the second-stage
bonus and therefore the incentive to deviate is increasing in the bonus payment. Hence, the
principal wants to implement the continuation contract such that the bonus payment is as low
as possible. As a consequence, she rather extends the deadline further and thereby increases the
success probability rather than increasing only the bonus payment keeping the deadline at the
second-best level.
Taking this continuation contract as given, I next characterize the minimal total reward process
that induces incentive compatibility of an effort path {a1,t}t≥0 in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2. The minimal required continuaton utility to induce effort {a1,t}t≥0 in the









g + (1− p1,T1)λb
and wt = 0 for all t > T1, if there is a T1 such that a1,t = 0 for all t > T1.
This proposition shows that due to the informativeness of the first stage the agent has to
receive an additional rent to exert effort if he is assigned experimentation in the second stage.









2.4 Derivation of the Optimal Contract
agent’s continuation value is decreasing over time and can be disentangled into three components



















The first term corresponds to the agent’s instantaneous cost of effort that he has to be
compensated for. This changes over time as the agent becomes more pessimistic when exerting
effort. However, this induces the procrastination incentive to obtain a higher reward and the
agent has to be granted a procrastination rent. Moreover, due to the persistence of the private
information across the stages, the agent has to obtain the informativeness rent. To incentivize
effort the total reward on path has to decrease sufficiently steeply over time. The rate at which
it decreases is such that the gain from delaying effort and thereby becoming more optimistic
than the principal in the second stage is at most as large as the value the agent loses from not
succeeding today. Importantly, it has to decrease more steeply if the value of the continuation
contract is higher because it implies that a higher bonus payment is required in the second
stage. Hence, the more utility the agent receives through a continuation contract, the higher
is the incentive to divert the beliefs. This induces first-stage information rents to increase in
the value of the continuation contract at a given success time for all earlier success times. This
creates a downside of using continuation contracts and therefore long-term incentives because
they induce informativeness rents in the first stage. However, using continuation contracts also
has an advantage over bonus payments: by using continuation contracts the principal generates
a continuation value to herself as she only receives the benefits of the project if second-stage
experimentation is successful. Moreover, recall that second-stage experimentation is inefficiently
short due to procrastination rents. Suppose that the principal has to provide the agent with an
additional unit of total reward after a first-stage success. Then, she has to choose whether to
deliver this through a first-stage bonus payments, which implies lower information rents for earlier
successes in the first stage, or through a more valuable continuation contract, which generates
additional surplus in the second stage through more efficient second-stage experimentation. This
tradeoff is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Introducing a bonus payment after late first-stage successes
reduces the information rents at all previous success times but costs profits at the respective
success time.
Therefore, the informativeness of the first stage induces a tradeoff between short-term incentives
that only condition on current performance, i.e., bonus payments after the first success, and
long-term incentives that condition on future performance as well. This tradeoff does not arise in
a setting without persistent information across stages because the agent does not have the ability
to divert the beliefs that the second-stage contract terms condition on. Therefore, in a setting
with independent stages the principal would never use bonus payments that only condition on
first-stage success. In the following I am restricting attention to the case of costly incentives
defined below.
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Figure 2.2: Tradeoff between Continuation Contract and Bonus Payment.
The left panel shows a hypothetical total reward of the agent as a function of the success time
if the agent were rewarded with a continuation contract only. The total reward therefore
decreases relatively steeply. The brown line illustrates the corresponding profits of the agent.
The right panel shows how the optimal contract improves on the hypothetical contract illus-
trated in the left panel: by introducing bonus payments at the end, it reduces the informative-
ness rents for all earlier success. The dotted lines are the total reward and profits from the
left panel as benchmark.
Definition 1 (Costly Incentives). First stage incentives are costly if the agent’s first-stage
incentive constraint is binding for all t ∈ [0, T1]. That is
(2.6) γt ≡ w˙t − ∂v(t, Aˆ1,t, A1,t)
∂A1,t
a1,t
is such that γt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T1]. A sufficient condition for costly incentives to occur is that
w˙t ≤ v˙SBt and wT1 ≥ vSBT1 .
This implies that the principal does not provide the agent with more utility than necessary to
ensure incentive compatibility in the first stage. That is, the first-stage incentive constraint is
binding for all t ∈ [0, T1]. It may be the case that under some parameter values, the principal
is willing to give more utility to the agent than necessary. This can occur if the incentives in
the first stage are relatively cheap such that a continuation value less than the value of the
second stage alone would incentivize the agent to work in the first stage. If incentives are
relatively cheap, the incentive constraint still requires γt ≥ 0 as in Proposition 2.2. As the main
contribution of my paper lies in the analysis of the first-stage incentives and the corresponding
optimal contract, I am assuming that first-stage incentives are costly.
The following theorem shows how the optimal contract solves this tradeoff in the costly
incentives case.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that first-stage incentives are costly. The total reward wt the agent
receives conditional on completing the first stage at time t induces full effort, is strictly decreasing
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at s.t. w(T1) =
c
pT1λ
g + (1− pT1)λb
and has wt = 0 for all t > T1. There is a tˆ ∈ (0, T1) such that wt = vt and b1,t = 0 for all
t ∈ [0, tˆ]; i.e., early successes are rewarded with continuation contracts only.
For all t ∈ (tˆ, T1], wt > v(t) and b1,t > 0 with b1,twt increasing in t; i.e., if the success is obtained
after tˆ, the total reward consists of a continuation contract and a bonus payment with the share
of the bonus payment in the total reward increasing in the success time.
The continuation contract, v(t), is implemented according to the optimal second-stage contract
as in Proposition 2.1.
Theorem 2.1 implies that the composition of the reward changes over time. Early successes
are rewarded with continuation contracts only and the second-stage contract has deadlines close
to the first best. If the success arrives late, the reward consists of bonus payments as well as
less valuable experimentation assignment in the second stage. The part of the reward that is
provided to the agent with a bonus payment is increasing, the later the breakthrough is obtained.
The reason that a lower share of the reward is provided with continuation contracts over time
is that the additional gain in overall surplus from extended deadlines is decreasing in the belief
about the project’s quality. This belief is decreasing in the first-stage success time. Moreover,
the arising ratchet effect implies that higher information rents have to be paid for all earlier
success times if more utility is delivered through a continuation contract. By choosing the share
of the total reward that is delivered through a continuation contract, the principal can control
the information rents for all earlier successes. At earlier success times, the agent has to be
granted a sufficiently higher reward to prevent him from delaying effort. If a success at a later
time is rewarded with a relatively high share of utility through a continuation contract, the
gain from holding a more optimistic belief then is high. Therefore, a higher reward for earlier
successes is needed to prevent a deviation. Hence, bonus payments become more favorable for
later successes for two reasons: the effect on information rents for earlier successes increases and
the gain of extending deadlines decreases in the belief.
It is interesting to note that the optimal contract provides a decreasing amount of value
through a continuation contract and therefore induces the continuation contract instruments
to vary with success times. The second-stage deadline is strongly dependent on the first-stage
success time while the second-stage bonus is not as dependent on performance as in the second-
best contract. The reason is, as discussed above, that the incentive cost is lower if the agent is
rewarded with extended deadlines rather than with higher bonus payments. However, having
the bonus payment become less dependent on performance reduces the ratchet effect.
Corollary 2.2. Second-stage deadlines are decreasing in the first-stage success time and more
responsive to it than in the second-best contract.
Bonus payments are increasing in the first-stage success time and less responsive to it than in
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the second-best contract.











Figure 2.3: Deadline and Bonus in Optimal Contract.
The left panel shows how the second-stage deadline in the optimal contract varies with the
first-stage success time compared to the first-best and second-best deadline.
The right panel show how the second-stage bonus in the optimal contract varies with the
first-stage success time compared to the first-best and second-best bonus.
2.5 Endogenous Agent Replacement
In this section, I consider the case in which the principal has access to another agent for the
second stage. This gives her the additional choice whether to keep the agent from the first stage
to work in the second stage as well or whether she rather has a new agent and get the second-best
value in the second stage. If the agent is replaced, he is rewarded with a bonus payment only and
no continuation value. As shown in the previous section, this implies that at those success times
at which the agent is replaced, he does not need to receive the informativeness rent. Therefore,
the principal saves on rents for earlier success times when replacing the agent. However, she
foregoes the possibility to gain from extended deadlines in the second stage. Replacement is
the most extreme bonus payment and saves the most informativeness rents. Without a new
agent this corresponds to terminating the project as no continuation value is granted to the
agent and no second-stage experimentation takes place. Because the principal can obtain the
second-best value after replacement if she has access to a new agent, I show that she will always
make use of this possibility for success times close to the deadline. The optimal contract with
replacement is illustrated in Figure 2.4. I assume that parameters are such that we are in the
costly incentives case. If the agent has not to be granted rents that exceed the second-best value
it is straightforward that replacement may not be desirable from the principal’s point of view.
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Theorem 2.2. Suppose that first-stage incentives are costly. If the principal has access to
another agent in the second stage, she will choose two deadlines, Tˆ and T1 in the first stage. For
all t ∈ [0, Tˆ ], the agent receives wt upon a breakthrough as in the optimal contract with boundary




and works in the second stage. For all t ∈ (Tˆ, T1], the
agent receives wt = bt = wT1 upon a breakthrough and a new agent works on the second-stage
contract according to the second-best value and the belief given by p2,0(A1,τ1). If no success has
been obtained by T1, the project is terminated.








Replacement at T ′1, termination at T1
No replacement, termination at T ′1
No replacement, termination at T1
Reward provided to new agent
Total reward delivered to all agents
Figure 2.4: Agent Replacement.
The orange line shows a hypothetical reward process with a short deadline T ′1. The blue
line show a hypothetical reward process with longer deadline T ′1. The green line shows the
evolution of a contract that rewards the agent at least partially with a continuation contract
for a success before T ′1 and with a bonus payment only for a success before the deadline
T1. The dashed black line corresponds to the new agent’s value in the second stage if the
first-stage agent is replaced. The dashed green line is the total reward that both agents receive
in the replacement region.
is not obvious: there is no learning about the agent’s type but still the successful agent gets
replaced, although continuation contracts are ”cheaper” to provide the required utility than
bonus payments. In particular, when the first milestone is not informative about the second
stage, replacement between stages never occurs because there are no information rents to be
saved by replacement. Moreover, if agents could be continuously replaced even within a stage at
no cost, the principal would replace the agent continuously and induce first-best experimentation
because no dynamic agency rents have to be paid at all. Theorem 2.2 shows that informative
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milestones give rise to replacement of agents that do succeed in their assigned task but took
relatively long to do so. The underlying reason is that continuation contracts give rise to the
informativeness rents caused by the persistence of learning. Hence, replacement occurs to reduce
information rents in the first stage. This may be one explanation for high managerial turnover
rates in the innovative industries found by Hannan et al. (1996), for example.
2.6 Extensions
2.6.1 Project Design
In this section, I study the choice of the informativeness of the first stage and endogenous staging,
i.e., the decision of choosing one or two stages for the project. In many instances, a milestone
may not be necessary to implement the full project but still the principal requires it: when a
prototype is required, it may serve as an informative signal about the project. Typically, the
principal is able to decide on the informativeness of the prototype; that is, how many details of
the final product should be incorporated. The tradeoff of the principal is that on the one hand
she wants the signal to be as informative as possible to prevent funding a bad-quality project
in the second stage. On the other hand, if the initial informativeness is low, then if the signal
becomes marginally more informative, the agent’s ability to divert the beliefs increases and
therefore the informativeness rent in the first stage does as well. However, the capital required
for the first stage is increasing in the informativeness because the more informative is the first
tak, the closer it is to the final product. Hence, the optimal level of informativeness is not




can be interpreted as the informativeness of the first stage. The higher is the
ratio the higher is the upward jump in the belief after a success. If λ
g
λb
→∞, there is certainty
after a first-stage success that the project is of good quality. If λ
g
λb
→ 1, there is no learning at
all. I assume that the more has been learned in the first stage, the faster is a success obtained
in the first stage. Towards this, I assume that the good project’s intensity rate in the second
stage is given by λ = λ
g
λb
. This implies that when the first stage is perfectly informative, there
is no second stage because λ = ∞. I can show that the two-stage contract converges to the
second-best one-stage contract as λb → 0. Also, I change λg with λb such that the expected
duration of project completion conditional on the quality being good remains constant, which
yields λg = 1+λb when normalizing λg(λb = 0) = 1. An additional advantage of this formulation
is that for all combinations of λg and λb under this restriction the belief evolution in the first














which is decreasing in λb and goes to one as λb goes to zero. To capture the feature of capital
infusions that are contingent on milestones, I let the fixed cost per stage, fi depend on the




). I assume that if λ
g
λb
→∞ the cost of the second stage converges to zero and
the first stage cost converges to the one-stage case. Moreover, I continue to assume that the
parameters are such that we are in the costly incentives case. Otherwise, the principal would get
the informative first stage signal without having to deliver any additional rents and the staging
decision became trivial.
As a first result I show that the optimal two-stage contract converges to the optimal one-stage
contract as the first stage becomes perfectly informative.
Lemma 2.3. With λ = λ
g
λb
and λb → 0, the two-stage optimal contract from the previous
sections, converges to the optimal one-stage contract with λonestage = λg(λb = 0).
This result allows me to study endogenous staging as a choice of λb numerically quite
straightforwardly. When the principal chooses λb = 0 the problem collapses to a one-stage
problem. Note that in the present setting, the principal cannot choose an entirely uninformative
first stage except for the limit case λb →∞ because λg = 1 + λb > λb. In this case, again, the
problem would collapse to a one-stage problem because the first stage is immediately completed
and there is no way to divert beliefs for the agent. It is immediate that the principal would
never choose a perfectly uninformative first stage λb = λg. This would make the first stage a
pure moral hazard stage without any signal. Still, the agent has to be incentivized to exert
effort. That is, the principal would have to deliver additional rents to the agent without gaining
from the first stage.
It follows from the comparative statics of the optimal contract in the informativeness that the
informativeness rent is inversely u-shaped in the informativeness. If the first stage is entirely
uninformative, then the informativeness rent is zero. If the first stage is fully informative, it
is zero as well. In between, it is strictly positive. Hence, moving from a one-stage project to
a two-stage project with a somewhat informative first stage has the following effects: (i) a
positive informativeness rent has to be delivered to the agent in expectation (ii) the principal
can condition the second capital infusion on the first-stage outcome. These two effects work
against each other and it depends on the parameters which one dominates. Note that if the
initial belief is sufficiently high, investing all capital at once and avoiding the informativeness
rent is more attractive. If the initial belief is lower, investing all capital at once is less attractive
because it is lost with a high probability. However, the principal may then introduce a first
stage at a cost that is lower than investing into the full project immediately to generate an
informative signal and condition the second infusion on this signal.
Numerical Results. In a numerical analysis in Mathematica, I study the endogenous choice
of staging and the optimal degree of informativeness of the first stage. This reveals that the
previously discussed tradeoff between terminating bad projects and agent’s information rents is
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relevant when designing a project. In several specifications, the optimal degree of informativeness
is interior and hence the choice of two stages dominates a one-stage project. However, not
requiring a milestone may also be optimal under other parameter values. The analysis reveals
intuitive comparative statics, as the agency conflict increases, the optimal informativeness
decreases. This follows because the cost of the informativeness is increasing in the agency conflict
and hence, the optimal informativeness is reduced. Also, the principal chooses an inefficiently
low level of informativeness.
The conjecture that projects with lower initial beliefs; i.e., more risky projects are more likely
to be staged investments seems to be true in numerical examples. This is in line with the findings
in Bienz and Hirsch (2011).
2.6.2 Privately Observable Successes
One important feature of the optimal contract derived is that even if successes were not publicly
but only privately observable, the agent would not make use of the possibility to strategically
hide a success. In principle, a profitable deviation of the agent could be to hide a success if it is
obtained instead of shirking to divert the beliefs. However, the gain from hiding a success is the
same as the gain from shirking for an instant: it alters the principal’s belief in the following
stage and therefore increases the value of the continuation contract from the agent’s perspective.
The optimal contract precludes this behavior by rewarding earlier successes with higher rents.
Hence, the agent would immediately reveal a private breakthrough.
Corollary 2.3. If successes are privately observed by the agent, the agent immediately reveals a
success.
It follows from this corollary that the assumption of publicly observable breakthroughs is
without loss of generality. In principle, with private observability the agent has an incentive
to strategically delay the arrival of a success due to the arising ratchet effect. The principal
needs to impose an additional truthtelling/revelation constraint on her optimization problem.
However, by inspecting the incentive to hide a success, it becomes apparent that this condition
coincides with the decision to exert effort. Hence, the optimal contract satisfies the revelation
constraint as well and the agent immediately reveals a success.
2.6.3 Learning About Agent’s Type
If the learning is about the agent’s type instead of the project and the project’s quality is known,
the optimal contract without replacement is as in Theorem 2.1. However, replacement is different
in this case because a new agent is hired, that is at the beginning of the second stage the initial
belief is back at the initial prior p0. This changes the optimal replacement deadline, but not
the incentive to introduce a replacement region. It may even be more attractive to introduce
replacement because it allows to increase the belief at the beginning of the second stage if the
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principal became too pessimistic in the first stage. The continuation value for the principal upon
replacement would therefore be unaffected by first stage outcomes and she can always guarantee
herself at least this continuation payoff after a first-stage success.
Corollary 2.4. If the agent’s type is unknown, the optimal contract without replacement is as in
Theorem 2.1. With replacement and independent agents, the continuation value after replacing
the agent is independent of the timing of the first breakthrough and given by the second-best value
under the initial prior belief vSB(p2,0 = p0).
This shows that replacement may also occur due to information rent reasons if learning is
about the agent’s type. That is, replacement does not only occur because the agent is too likely
to be of low quality but to reduce informativeness rents that he would have to be provided if he
would receive a continuation contract. However, the possibility to obtain a new agent whose
quality is drawn according to the initial prior makes replacement attractive as well. It increases
the continuation value for the principal if the belief about the current agent’s quality is low.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the optimal contract for a two-stage project under full commitment in
a dynamic moral hazard setting with ex ante symmetric information and learning within and
across stages.
I show that the informativeness of the first stage gives rise to an endogenously arising ratchet
effect. As a consequence, the optimal contract has to provide the agent with additional rents
for good performance. Moreover, using long-term rewards with continuation contracts that
condition on future performance is costly in that they amplify the ratchet effect and therefore
increase the agent’s information rents. This induces the composition of the total reward to
change with performance: bad performance cannot be identified as either bad luck or simple
shirking. Thus, the agent receives a higher share of the total reward as a bonus payment rather
than a continuation contract if a success is obtained later. Good performance is rewarded more
with continuation contracts because these reduce the inefficiencies in the second stage caused
by procrastination rents. If the principal has the ability to replace agents after stages, she
will make use of this possibility for the latest success times that still induce continuation. By
replacing the agent, the principal eliminates the incentive to manipulate the performance within
the replacement region and therefore reduces informativeness rents for all success times.
My analysis has several empirical implications: (i) The composition of the agent’s compensation
changes with performance. In particular, if performance gets worse, the total reward is lower and
consists of relatively more short-term than long-term rewards. For example, a well-performing
CEO is rewarded with stock options that are tied to future performance. A CEO that performs
worse is rewarded with bonus payments and less with stock options. The total worth of the
reward is higher for the well-performing CEO. (ii) Deadlines are relatively more responsive to
early performance while final-stage bonus payments are less responsive to early performance
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compared to a setting without informativeness rents. (iii) Early-stage deadlines are relatively
short if there is a learning spillover to future stages. (iv) Even successful agents may be replaced
if they do not perform sufficiently well although the project is continued and the agent known
to be able to complete future tasks. (v) Staging occurs more frequently if the initial risk is high.
Besides studying these empirical implications, there are still open avenues for future research:
First, it would be interesting to consider the case of no or only partial commitment of the
principal. Second, in a setting with ex ante private information of the agent, one may wonder
whether a menu of differently staged contracts can elicit the agent’s superior information about
the project. Third, analyzing how competition between agents and free-riding interact in the





The following results will be used frequently throughout the analysis.
Probability that no success has occurred until t. The Poisson distribution implies that no





Using the definition of the posterior and its law of motion, dpt = −pt(1 − pt)∆λa1,t, we can
rewrite this probability. First, note that the law of the posterior can be written as
−ptλga1,t = dpi,t
1− pi,t − pi,tλ
ba1,t.
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Using the posterior at time t, 1− pi,t = e
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where pii(t) is the principal’s value of a success in stage i at time t.
Posteriors and Odds Ratios. The belief in the second stage depends on the success time in
the first stage and parameters of the model. The initial belief in terms of primitives and success
time is given by
p2,0(τ1) =
λgp0e








and the posterior after an experimentation duration of t in the second stage
p2,0(τ1, t) =
λgp0e
− ∫ τ10 λga1,sds−∫ t0 λa1,sds
λgp0e
− ∫ τ10 λga1,sds−∫ t0 λa1,sds + λb(1− p0)e− ∫ τ10 λba1,sds .
The odds ratio is then given by
p2,0(τ1, t)






− ∫ τ1+tτ1 λa1,sds−(λg−λb) ∫ τ10 a1,sds.
Bonus contracts are without loss of generality. The same argument as in Moroni (2016)
yields the result. Denote the general payment process {wfdt+ wl}t≥0 by w. w maps histories
into payments, w : Ht → R. Consider a bonus contract b that only has payments at time zero
(τ0 = 0) and breakthrough times τ1 and τ2. Define wi(∅, hτi−1) as discounted payoff that payment
process w delivers to the agent given the history if the game ended without a breakthrough at
hτi . Then, let b0 = w1(∅, h0) and bτ1(hτ1) = erτ1 (wi+1(∅, hτi)− wi(∅, hτi−1)). This is a bonus
contracts giving the same expected payoff after every history to the agent as the initial contract
w. Limited liability is satisfied in the bonus contract as well if no positive payments are made
if no breakthrough is obtained in a stage. Such a payment rule is clearly suboptimal for the
principal.
2.8.2 Proofs
If it does not cause confusion, I drop stage indices in the proofs to simplify notation.
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Proof of Lemma 2.1. 12 The proof relies on Pontryagin’s maximum principle. The second-
stage analysis in my model resembles the one of Moroni (2016). The agent’s problem is to choose







0 psλasdsat (ptλb2,t − c) dt.
Using the definition of the posterior as well as the differential equation determining its law, this








−λ ∫ t0 asdsλb2,t − (p0e−λ ∫ t0 asds + 1− p0)c) dt.
Defining At =
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−λAtλb2,t − cp0e−λAt − c(1− p0)
)
dt
s. t. A˙t = at.













−λAtλb2,t − cp0e−λAt − c(1− p0)
)
+ ηt,
then if γt > 0, the agent will exert effort, at = 1, and if γt < 0, he will exert no effort at = 0.
If the principal wants to induce effort, she will choose γt = 0 at which the agent is indifferent
between working and shirking. This is optimal, because whenever γt > 0, the principal can
increase her payoff by slightly reducing b2,t without altering the agent’s incentives.
The standard boundary condition gives ηT = 0 implying γT = e
−rT (p0e−λAtλb2,T − cp0e−λAt − c(1− p0)).




−λAt(λb2,t − c)− c(1− p0)
)
.
Differentiating this with respect to time and equating it with (OBJ) delivers




−λAt(λb2,t − c)− c(1− p0)
)
12The existence and sufficiency results to the optimal control problem analyzed for the second stage in this
paper follow directly from Moroni (2016) and the references therein.
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induces effort path {at} up to time T .
In the limit r → 0, the bonus payment is constant over time b˙2,t = 0 and pinned down by the
static moral hazard constraint at the deadline.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. First, consider the second-best second-stage contract without
a promise-keeping constraint. Recall that incentive compatibility requires b˙2,t follows from
Lemma 2.1. The principal wants to induce full effort which follows from Moroni (2016) in the
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Consider the case of the promise-keeping constraint. The promise-keeping constraint is given
by
v(τ1, T2(τ1)) ≥ v(τ1)





r(eλT − 1) + λ(1− erT )
)
Again Lemma 2.1 pins down the incentive compatibility condition. With promise-keeping
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that can be solved for T2(A1,τ1) by the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. This is solved by the second-best
bonus, whenever v(τ1, T2(τ1)) > v(τ1) as then µ = 0 and we are in the case of the second best.
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If r → 0, this is solved by











where W−1 denotes the negative branch of the Lambert-W-function.
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The agent’s value, wt ≡ b1,t + vt, consists of a promised utility from
the second stage, vt, and a bonus payment after the first success, b1,t. Note that the continuation
value of the agent depends on the agent’s private information. The principal promises the
continuation value conditional on the expected exerted effort, Aˆ1,t. Conditional on this, she
implements a bonus and a deadline in the second stage. However, the true total effort that
the agent has exerted is private information, A1,t =
∫ t
0 asds. The promised utility is given by
v(t) and implemented through the continuation contract in Proposition 2.1. The value from
the agent’s view is given by v(t, A1,t) and depends on the true effort because she may hold a
















+ (1− p0)λbe−λbAt)(b1,t + v(t, At))− (p0e−λgAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt)c
)
+ ηt ≥ 0
(2.8)











The boundary condition is given by ηT = 0 which yields
(bT + v(T,AT )) = c
p0e
−ATλg + (1− p0)e−ATλb
p0λge−ATλ
g + (1− p0)λbe−ATλb
.(2.10)







+ (1− p0)λb2e−Atλb)(b1,t + v(t, At))
−(p0λge−λgAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt)∂v(t, At)
∂At
)
















+ (1− p0)λb2e−Atλb)v(t, At)− (p0λge−λgAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt)c
− (p0λge−λgAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt)
(




or with γt not fixed











+ (1− p0)λb2e−Atλb)v(t, At)− (p0λge−λgAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt)c
− (p0λge−λgAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt)
(




or (2.8) Equating this with (2.11) yields
b˙t + v˙(t, At) = r
(
b1,t + v(t, At)− p0e
−λgAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt
p0λge−λ










gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
.
(2.14)
Hence, if the promised utility follows (2.42) together with the boundary equation (2.10), the
principal can induce the effort in the interval [0, T ].
If r → 0, this reduces to






gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Alternatively, the principal could provide the agent with utility by
varying the boundary condition, B, for the bonus payment and differing the deadline. The
payment rule, however, still has to satisfy incentive-compatibility. The bonus payment for each
t under an alternative deadline is given by
b(t, B) = Be−r(T−t) − c
(
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p2,0(Aˆt)r(r − λ)(r + λ)
·
(
(λ+ 1)(λ− r)rp2,0(Aˆt)p2,0(At) + e−rT p2,0(At)r(ceλT (p2,0(Aˆt)− 1)r + (B + c)p2,0(Aˆt)(r − λ))(λ+ r)
+(λ+ r)(c(p2,0(At)− 1)p2,0(Aˆt)r) + c(p2,0(At)r − p2,0(Aˆt)(−1 + p2,0(At) + rp2,0(At)))λ
−(r − λ)e−(r+λ)T (ceλT ((p2,0(At)− 1)p2,0(Aˆt) + p2,0(At)(p2,0(Aˆt)− 1)r)(r + λ))











p2,0(Aˆt)r(r − λ)(r + λ)(
(1 + λ)cp2,0(Aˆt)r(λ− r) + re−rT (ceλT (p2,0(Aˆt)− 1)r + (B + c)p2,0(Aˆt)(r − λ))(r + λ)
(r + λ)(cp2,0(Aˆt)r + c(r − p2,0(Aˆt)(1 + r))λ)




To see how this varies with the composition of the continuation contract note that it follows
from the implicit function theorem applied on the promise-keeping condition that the deadline






(B − c)p2,0(Aˆt)(r + λ) + eλT (−c(1− p2,0(Aˆt))(λ+ reλT ) + r(p2,0(Aˆt)B − c))
< 0.
That is, as intuitive, if the boundary condition increases, the deadline decreases. Considering






re2λT (1− p2,0(Aˆt))c+ eλT (cp2,0(Aˆt)− (c+Bp2,0(Aˆt))r)(2.19)
+p2,0(Aˆt)(c(r − 1) +B(λ+ r)))
)
(2.20)
which is positive. Hence, by extending the deadline, the principal reduces the incentive to
deviate in the first stage.
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Evolution of Agent’s Continuation Utility. The agent’s utility from the second stage may
evolve different than the v(t) because it depends on his private information about the true effort.
The promised utility to the agent is denoted by v(t) which coincides with the agent’s continuation
utility if he is on path, i.e., if A1,t = t. However, if the agent has deviated, v(t) 6= v(t, A1,t)
where the latter denotes the agent’s continuation utility given his private information A1,t. We
know that the on-path utility evolves according to
w˙(t, A1,t) = r
(
b1,t + v(t, A1,t)− p0e
−λgA1,t + (1− p0)e−λbA1,t
p0λge−λ







For an agent that has exerted effort Aˆ1,t, the value of succeeding the first stage at t is given by







rT − λp2,0(A1,t)erT − r(1− p2,0(A1,t))eλT )
+(1− p2,0(Aˆ1,t))p2,0(A1,t)(r − λ) + p2,0(A1,t)erT (λ− r)
)
where p2,0(A1,t) is the principal’s belief at the beginning of the second stage and p2,0(Aˆ1,t) is
the agent’s belief. This can be simplified substantially to
v(Aˆ1,t, A1,t) = v(t)
p2,0(Aˆ1,t)
p2,0(A1,t)
− cr(1− erT2(A1,t))p2,0(Aˆ1,t)− p2,0(A1,t)
p2,0(A1,t)
.
The total value is evolving according to
w˙(Aˆ1,t, A1,t) = b˙t + v˙(Aˆ1,t, A1,t).(2.22)
Hence, if r → 0


























1 + (1− pt)λb1)v(t, A1,t)− c
)
dt(2.24)
s.t. w˙(t, A1,t) = b˙t + v˙(t, A1,t)(2.25)
w˙(t) = r
(
b1,t + v(t, A1,t)− p0e
−λgA1,t + (1− p0)e−λbA1,t
p0λge−λ
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Existence of Solution to Agent’s Problem Existence follows from Clarke (2013), Theorem
23.11. The theorem applies as:
• the laws of motion of the state variables, At, w(t, At) and w(t) are measurable in t and
continuous in At
• the control set at ∈ [0, 1] is closed and convex
• the running cost is
– Lesbesgue measurable in t and (A, a)
– lower semicontinuous in (A, a)
– convex in a for any (t, A)
• the effort path at = 0 for all t and At = 0 for all t is admissible and delivers a finite value.





gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
)






bt + v(t, At)− p0e
−λgAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt
p0λge−λ














bt + v(t, At)− p0e
−λgAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt
p0λge−λ













gAt + (1− p0)λb2e−λbAt
)







gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
)
− ηtr + ζt
(2.33)








tiplier µ and moreover boundary conditions γT = 0, η0 = 0, ηT = µ,A0 = 0. Note that





−λAspids and c(T2(t), t) is the total expected experimentation cost from choosing




Maximization with respect to at. To see that the principal wants to implement full effort










g + (1− pt)λb)
(−Π(At)− atdtΠ′(At) + Π(At+dt)))
+ dt2
Πt+2dt
 (at − at+dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, if at continuous








∂Π(At+dt)∂at − ∂Π(At+dt)∂at+dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 at+dt(at((1− pt)λb + ptλg) + 12(1− pt)2λb2pt(1− pt)λgλb + 12p2tλg2
)
− dt2 (at − at+dt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 if at continuous
(





(1− pt)2λb2 + 2(1− pt)ptλbλg + ptλg2) + (1− pt)λb2 + ptλg2
)
atΠ(At) + 12atdtΠ′(at)− at+dtat︸ ︷︷ ︸
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g + (1− pt)λb)Π(At+dt)− c
)
Note that Π˙(At) − atΠ′(At) is zero up to the second order and therefore the expression is
negative as long as t is less than the first-best. Thus, welfare increases if effort is frontloaded.
Moreover, note that the expected payment to the agent is decreasing if effort is frontloaded. If
discounting dominates learning in a way that the expected payment to the agent is increasing
for some measure of time an argument similar to the one in Moroni (2016) delivers optimality of
frontloading. Hence, the principal prefers frontloading of effort, that ist at = 1 for t ∈ [0, T1].
Maximization with respect to T2(t). Note that whenever wt − v(T2(t), t) > 0 a bonus is paid
to the agent and ζt = 0. ζt follows from the first-order condition with respect to time as




























gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt









































using the boundary condition η0 = 0. Note that ηt is increasing over time as T2(t) > T
SB
2 (t) by
optimality and costly incentives. Continuity of ηt implies that there is a tˆ such that ζt > 0 for














which cannot be satisfied in a neighborhood of t = 0 if the principal is optimizing. To see why,
note that the left-hand side is the first-order condition for the social planner. To induce effort in
that solution, the bonus has to be equal to 1 and the principal makes zero profits. It is easy to
construct a contract that induces positive profit for the principal. Thus, we have a contradiction
and ζt > 0 for t ∈ [0, tˆ]. Moreover, the left-hand side is decreasing
Moreover, it can be seen that as soon as a positive bonus payment is used, that is, when
ζt = 0, the bonus of the reward that is given to the agent with a bonus payment is increasing














Because ηt measures the marginal cost of changing the state vt (note that only changing vt
affects the evolution of wt) it follows that this is increasing over time and hence, for any level wt
of current promised value of succeeding, the principal provides more of this utility through a
bonus payment wt − vt(T2).























































and bonus transfers could
not be used. However, the latter can be shown to be greater than the former and as the other
term is increasing in t, tˆ less than the deadline if no bonus payment is used. By giving the
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principal the additional possibility of a bonus payment she is at least weakly better off and
hence, tˆ < T1.
Sufficiency of the Necessary Conditions Because we have established the existence of a
solution previously, we can conclude that if {at} is the only effort path that satisfies the
necessary conditions, these are also sufficient. Recall that necessity requires an effort path {aˆt}
together with a costate γˆt such that they satisfy (2.8). Recall that we have from (2.15)
γ˙t
p0λge−λ
gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
= −r
(
bt + v(t, At)− p0e
−λgAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt
p0λge−λ
gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
c
)




which we can, using the on-path and off-path values, rewrite as
˙ˆγt
p0λge−λ




−λgAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt
p0λge−λ
gAt + (1− p0)λbe−λbAt
− p0e
−λgAˆt + (1− p0)e−λbAˆt
p0λge−λ














Define τ0 ≡ inf{t|γˆt 6= 0}. Suppose τ0 = 0 and γˆτ0 > 0. By continuity of γˆt, there is an ε such
that for γˆt < 0 for t ∈ (0, ε). By optimality, we know that aˆt = 0 for t ∈ (0, ε). This implies
that Aˆt ≤ At where Aˆt corresponds to the effort of the hypothetical effort path {aˆt} and At to
the on-path effort path {at}. I want to show that ˙ˆγt < 0 if Aˆt ≤ At for r close to zero. Recall
(2.23), then, (2.43) further reduces to
˙ˆγt
p0λge−λ























The right-hand side is now less than zero as Aˆ1,t ≤ A1,t implies p2,0(Aˆ1,t) ≥ p2,0(A1,t). Hence,
we know that ˙ˆγt < 0 on t ∈ (0, ε) implying that γˆt < 0. Together this implies that γˆt < 0 for all
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where the inequality follows from AˆT ≤ AT . γˆT ≥ 0 contradicts γˆt < 0 for all t ≤ T1. An
analogous argument applies for τ0 > 0. For all t < τ0, At = Aˆt and γˆt = 0. Following τ0 with
Aˆt < At, the reasoning from above yields a contradiction with the transversality condition. Note
that at = 1 will be optimal and this direction suffices to guarantee sufficiency of the necessary
conditions in the optimal contract.
Costly Incentives. Note that to complete the solution of the optimal control problem, we need
to prove that the principal always sets γt = 0 in the agent’s problem. This implies, that the
agent’s incentive constraint is never slack in the optimal contract. I restrict attention to this case,
as the main contribution of the paper lies in the case when first-stage incentives are relevant. In
the remaining cas es, it occurs that theprincipal wants to increase the agent’s value to get closer
to the second-stage second-best value. To do that, she increases γt above zero. These cases can
occur only if the agent’s promised value lies below the second-best value in some regions. The
problem can analogously solved for cases with γt > 0. Due to a lack of closed-form solutions
there is no sharp characterization of the parametric assumptions for the costly incentives case.
However, a sufficient condition on contract terms is that: w˙t < v˙
SB(t) for all t ∈ [0, T1] and
wT1 ≥ vSB(T1). This implies that at the first-stage deadline the value in the contract is higher
than the second-best value of the contract. Moreover, the total reward is decreasing steeper
than the value of the second-best contract. Hence, the total reward is always higher than the
second-best second-stage contract.
Existence of Solution to Principal’s Problem. Recall the requirements from Clarke (2013),
Theorem 23.11. Denote the control variables by a and the state variables by A. The theorem
applies as
• the laws of motion of the state variables, g(A) are measurable in t and continuous in A
• the control set a ∈ A is closed and convex
• the running cost is
– Lesbesgue measurable in t and (A, a)
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– lower semicontinuous in (A, a)
– convex in a for any (t, A)
• the effort path at = 0 for all t and At = 0 for all t is admissible and delivers a finite value.
The running cost is given by
Λ(t, A, a) = ate
−rt(p0e−λ
gAt + (1− p0)e−λbAt) (Π(t, v(t))− v(t)) .(2.46)
Convexity in a of the set {Λ(t, A, ·)} has to be established. It suffices to show that Λ is concave
in a. Suppose we are in the case with γt = 0. Then, it remains to show that Π(t, v(t)) is concave































p2,0(t)(piλ− c)(r + λ)e−(r+λ)T (w(t)) − r(1− p2,0(t))ce−rT (w(t))
)
which is less than zero. Hence, the running cost is concave in the promised utility and we can
conclude that the set Λ(t, A, ·) is convex.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Suppose the principal considers introducing an additional deadline,
T ′1 before the initial one, T1 to replace the agent if he succeeds before the second but after the
first. To simplify notation denote by Π the surplus in the second stage. Introducing T ′1 alters





Π(t, w(t, T ′1, T1))−Π(t, w(t, T1, T1))







ΠSB(t)−Π(t, w(t, T1, T1))













T1−T ′1 and taking the limit T
′













where the inequality follows from ∂Π(t)
∂w(t,T1,T ′1)




> 0. So there is an incentive to introduce entrepreneur replacement. Note
that if stages are independent
∂w(t,T1,T ′1
∂T ′1
|T ′1=T1 = 0.
On the other hand, suppose T ′1 = 0 and consider the choice of introducing a reward with










1, T1))− w(T ′1, T1)
)− c
pT1λ













ΠSB(T ′1)− wSB(T ′1)−Π(T ′1, w(T ′1, T1))
)
.(2.51)




, then Π(T ′1, w(T ′1, T1)) > ΠSB(T ′1) and increasing T ′1 is profitable.




, then Π(T ′1, w(T ′1, T1)) < ΠSB(T ′1), however, as the
principal’s payoff falls in the parameters that would increase the agent’s second-best value,
ΠSB(T ′1) − wSB(T ′1) < Π(T ′1, w(T ′1, T1)) and hence, a period without replacement would be
introduced.
Proof of Lemma 2.3. To show that the optimal two-stage contract converges to the optimal
one-stage contract I consider first the limits of the second-stage contract’s instruments, T (v(τ1))
and b2(T (v(τ1)). Recall that











We are now interested in the limit as λ→∞.
lim
λ→∞


























2 Informative Milestones in Experimentation
Applying L’Hoˆspital’s Rule gives
= − v(τ1)



































T (v(τ1)) = 0
(2.58)
as W−1 (x ↑ 0) =∞.





























































λgpτ1 + (1− pτ1)λb
= 1.(2.63)
So, that the second stage is immediately and successfully completed in the limit and the agent
receives v(τ1) as a payment while the principal keeps pi − v(τ1).




and no informativeness rent is required in the first stage. Hence, we may conclude that the
optimal two-stage contract converges to the optimal one-stage contract if λb → 0.
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3 The Effect of Asymmetric Common Value
Uncertainty in Procurement Auctions
joint with Stefan Weiergra¨ber
3.1 Introduction
Public procurement is an important sector of economies: In the OECD countries, public
procurement accounted for 12.1% of GDP in 2013.1 The use of auctions in public procurement
aims at creating competition between bidders and at selecting the efficient firm to carry out
the service. While auctions perform well in selecting the efficient bidder when participants
are symmetric, this is not necessarily the case when participants are asymmetric. Importantly,
bidders in procurement auctions are likely to be asymmetric: First, former monopolists or
incumbents may be better informed about the common value component due to their experience
or have access to superior information. Second, incumbents with a larger network may be either
more or less efficient, for example, due to economies of scale or capacity constraints.
Many procurement auctions involve both a private and a common value component. While
private value components typically consist of idiosyncratic cost components, typical common
values are common cost components or potential revenues from the object. However, empirical
studies of asymmetric auctions predominantly study private value auctions.2 Neglecting potential
asymmetries in common value components has substantial implications on the results: if
incumbents win systematically more often the theory of asymmetric private value auctions
attributes this to a more efficient cost distribution (see Maskin and Riley (2000a)). From an
efficiency perspective the incumbent wins too few auctions because its competitors bid more
aggressively. We show in a theoretical model with private and common value component that
the dominance of a firm can also be explained by asymmetrically precise common value signals.
In this case, the incumbent firm wins too many auctions from an efficiency perspective. Hence,
it is an important empirical questions to distinguish and to quantify the respective importance
of asymmetries in private and common value components.
Asymmetries between firms are particularly important in markets with experienced incumbents
and entrants that recently became active in the market. In the 1990s, many European countries
1See OECD (2015).
2See Athey et al. (2011), Suzuki (2010), Estache (2008) and Tas (2017).
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started to liberalize markets that used to be controlled by a state monopolist. The aim was a
more efficient provision of publicly subsidized goods due to increased competition. In many
markets experiences with privatization have been mixed, however. We exploit a detailed data
set on awardings in the German market for short-haul railway passenger services (SRPS) from
1995 to 2011. Since SRPS are generally not profitable, the state procures specific tracks to
train operating companies and subsidizes them for the provision of the service. While the
aim of the liberalization was to attract competitors, the former state monopolist (DB Regio)
still operates the majority of the tracks (71%, FAZ Nr. 281 (2015)). An explicit concern by
procurement agencies and industry experts is that entrants are either not participating at all or
bidding cautiously. The German market for SRPS is only one example, but given its size of 8
billion EUR in subsidies for 2016, is an important one that shares many features with similar
markets in other countries. DB has more experience for the services and as a publicly held firm
may have advantages for financing compared to its rivals. In addition, DB Vertrieb, which is
integrated with the DB holding has access to all the ticket revenue and passenger data. Entrants
and even agencies typically do not have access to this information (Monopolkommission 2013).
Considering these asymmetries, the reasons for DB still being the dominant firm are not clear.
On the one hand, it could be the efficient firm for most services. On the other hand, entrants
might bid very cautiously due to DB’s informational advantage about future revenues.
Comparing the winning bids of entrants with those of DB in gross auctions we find that
entrants win with significantly lower bids than DB. However, in net auctions there is no significant
difference in the winning bids. We take this as first evidence that DB is indeed better informed
about the common value component as entrants shade their bids relatively more in net compared
to gross contracts. Moreover, Hunold and Wolf (2013) provide reduced-form evidence for the
fact that using net contracts makes it more likely that DB Regio wins the awarding.
We take our model that builds on the theoretical work of Goeree and Offerman (2003)
to a detailed contract-level data set on German short-haul railway passenger service (SRPS)
procurement auctions. With this data set we can disentangle the two asymmetries by making use
of a variation in the contract design: local state agencies that procure these services can choose
who bears the revenue risk from ticket sales. If the ticket revenues remain with the agency (gross
contract) the auction is a standard asymmetric independent private values auction. If the train
operating company is the claimant of the ticket revenues (net contract), the auction is one with
a private value (cost) as well as a common value (ticket revenues) component. In a first step, we
estimate the cost distributions of DB and the entrants from the winning bids in gross auctions.
Identification follows from Athey and Haile (2007) who show that asymmetric independent
private value auctions are identified from the winning bid and the winner’s identity only. We use
several contract characteristics to control for the specifics of the respective contracts and obtain
the cost distribution conditional on contract characteristics. In a second step, we make use of
the net auction data. Given the first-step results, we know the cost distribution for each of the
awarded tracks. Hence, differences in bidding behavior that are not explained by the differences
in cost distributions can be attributed to the common value component. We can estimate the
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bid distribution as functions of a net cost signal that consists of the private and common value
signal as well as the informativeness of the common value signal.
The results of our structural analysis show no systematic cost advantage of DB over its
rivals. Importantly, they are not as large as one may initially expect - under a pure private
value assumption - given DB’s dominance in the market for SRPS. The estimation of the
informational advantage over its competitors reveals that indeed in most auctions DB holds
significantly more precise information about future ticket revenues. This highlights the concerns
in Monopolkommission (2015) that DB’s dominance is at least partially due to its informational
advantage which may call for regulatory interventions that symmetrize the information across
the bidders. Alternatively, efficiency could be increased by awarding more gross contracts which
eliminates the common value component from the auction. We study this intervention in a
counterfactual analysis and find that entrants shade their bids less than in net contract auctions,
making bid distributions more symmetric. This increases ex ante efficiency of the auctions from
64% to 75%.
The assumption that the choice between net and gross contracts is exogenous is important for
our analysis. This choice is typically strongly agency-dependent and there is only very little
variation within an agency over time, while track characteristics differ within and across agencies.
Therefore, we believe that the contract type (gross vs. net) is indeed not driven by fundamental
characteristics of a track but rather exogenously determined by the preferences of the agency.3
Related literature The SRPS industry is characterized by asymmetries of bidders due to the
presence of a former state monopolist and incumbent on many tracks, DB. Therefore, our
methodology builds on the theory of first-price asymmetric auctions.4 For example, theory
predicts that stochastically weaker firms bid more aggressively and stochastically stronger firms
win with higher profits (Maskin and Riley 2000a). Moreover, the release of public information
in a symmetric model implies more aggressive bids by all firms (reduced information rents). Our
application is also reminiscent of the theoretical literature on auctions of fixed price vs. cost-plus
contract as in Laffont and Tirole (1986) and McAfee and McMillan (1986). While they focus on
asymmetric information between the procurement agency and bidders and moral hazard after a
contract has been awarded, we abstract from the latter and focus on informational asymmetries
between competing bidders during the auction stage.
There is relatively little empirical literature on asymmetric common value auctions due to
known difficulties with identification in common value auctions (see Athey and Haile (2002). Li
and Philips (2012) analyze the predictions of the theoretical asymmetric common value auction
model in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) in a reduced-form analysis. They find evidence
for private information of neighbor firms in drainage lease auctions. Hong and Shum (2002)
3A comparison of track characteristics between the two different contract modes shows no significant difference
in either of the observed contract characteristics. In Bahn-Report (2007) it is also argued that the choice is rather
agency-dependent than an endogenous choice due to contract characteristics.
4See, for example, Parreiras (2006), Kirkegaard (2009), Maskin and Riley (2000a), Reny and Zamir (2004).
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investigate the effect of competition in a model with both private and common value components
and symmetric bidders. They find that the winner’s curse effect can outweigh the competition
effect so that more bidders can results in less aggressive bidding. In addition, Hong and Shum
(2002) estimate the relative importance of private and common value components in procurement
contracts in New Jersey. In contrast to their study, we have relatively precise information about
which parts of the contracts correspond to private and which to common value components.
Furthermore, we observe exogenous differences in the design of different auctions that eliminate
or add specific parts of risk for the bidding firms. This allows us to focus on the effect of
asymmetric information about the common value across incumbent and entrant bidders.
De Silva et al. (2003) analyze an asymmetric procurement model and confirm the theoretical
predictions of Maskin and Riley (2000a) with reduced form regressions using data on highway
procurement in Oklahoma. In a follow up paper, De Silva et al. (2009) argue that asymmetric
information about contract characteristics is a particularly important problem for new entrants.
However, their application is quite different from ours: We analyze a setting in which the
incumbent is usually more cost-efficient, but also faces less uncertainty about ticket revenues
than the entrants. In order to estimate our auction model, we rely on the literature on the
structural estimation of asymmetric auctions. In particular, we borrow elements from Brendstrup
and Paarsch (2006), Brendstrup and Paarsch (2003), Athey et al. (2011) and Hendricks et al.
(2003) and adapt them to our application.
While recent research (Lalive et al. 2015) analyzes the respective benefits of auctions and
negotiations in the context of our application, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
analyze the role of auction designs and asymmetric information in this market using structural
econometric methods. Lalive et al. (2015) analyze how the agency’s choice of whether to engage
in direct negotiations or to run an auction affects procurement outcomes. While they focus on
the trade-off between competitive auctions and non-competitive negotiations, we focus on the
specific auction design, in particular the implications of procuring net or gross contracts.
3.2 Auction Model and the Effect of Asymmetries
In this section, we present our model for procurement auctions of gross and net contracts and
study the effect of two asymmetries: (i) the effect of asymmetric private value distributions, and
(ii) the effect of asymmetric precision of the common value signals. All auctions are standard
first-price sealed-bid auctions. The valuation for a contract as well as the bidding behavior of
firms crucially depend on whether a gross or a net contract is tendered. For a
• gross contract, the valuation consists solely of the firm-specific costs of the contract (ci)
since the firm’s revenue is fully determined by the winning bid.
• net contract, the valuation consists of the firm-specific costs of the contract (ci) and
additionally the ticket revenues R, which are unknown to all firms when bidding for a
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contract.
We index bidding firms by i, its bid by bi and denote the number of bidders by N . The cost
component ci is a private value drawn for each firm i from Fci and is observed by i only. The
ticket revenue, R, is an unknown common value for which firms observe only a private signal, ri
drawn from Fr. We allow Fci to differ across firms to model differences across incumbent and
entrants in cost efficiency. The differential information about expected revenues comes from the
reliability of the own signal drawn from the common distribution Fr as discussed later on. All
signals are independent across firms and cost signals are independent of revenue signals within
firms. We assume that bidders are risk neutral.
Gross contract auctions Firms compete for a single indivisible item (one track) by submitting
bids bi (the requested subsidy). Firm i’s ex-post value of winning and the expected value of a
bid is given by the formulas for an independent private values (IPV) auction:
vi = bi − ci(3.1)
E[vi(bi)] = (bi − ci) · Pr(bi < mini 6=jbj |ci, bi)(3.2)
Ties are broken randomly. For reasons to be discussed in the next subsection, we assume that
Fci is logconcave. As the incumbent is vertically integrated with the network operator, DB
Netz, and is the former state monopolist as well as still publicly held by the Federal Republic
of Germany, we assume that the incumbent draws its costs from a different distribution than
the entrants. We further assume that entrants are symmetric for simplicity. As this gives rise
to an asymmetric auction, we build on the theoretical work on asymmetric IPV auctions, in
particular, we build on the predictions in Maskin and Riley (2000a).
In a gross contract, there is only ex ante uncertainty about the operating costs ci. Before
bidding, a firm receives private information about its costs which is distributed according to
Fci ∈ C2 with strictly positive density on support [ci,L, ci,H ]. After having received the signal,
firm i knows its cost perfectly. However, it does not know its rivals’ cost realizations.
Therefore, firm i chooses b to maximize expected profit:




where φj(b) is bidder j’s inverse bid function. Rodriguez (2000) and Reny and Zamir (2004)
establish that a unique equilibrium in pure strategies with strictly increasing and differentiable
bid functions exists. The equilibrium is implicitly defined by a system of differential equations in
inverse bid functions with boundary conditions. The solution to that system gives equilibrium
55
3 The Effect of Asymmetric Common Value Uncertainty in Procurement Auctions
existence. Denote by Gi the distribution of the opponents’ maximum bid given own bid b being
pivotal and a set of bidders N . Inverse bid functions have to satisfy:




We borrow the following Lemma and definition of conditional stochastic dominance5 both
adapted to the procurement setting from Maskin and Riley (2000a).
Lemma 3.1 (Maskin and Riley (2000a), Proposition 3.3 and Proposition 3.5.). If the private
value distribution of i conditionally stochastically dominates the private value distribution bidder
j, then i is the weak bidder and bids more aggressively than bidder j. The bid distribution of i is
stochastically dominates the bid distribution of j.
Lemma 3.1 shows that the weaker bidder bids more aggressively. As a result, the auction may
be inefficient and the strong bidder wins too few auctions from an efficiency perspective. This
result has been generalized by De Silva et al. (2003) to also hold in the presence of an additional
common value component and therefore, also holds for the net auction case.
Net contract auctions When net contracts are procured, the bidders’ value of a contract
consist of a private cost and a common value component. We develop an asymmetric first-price
auction model with both, private and common value components. The value of the item differs
among bidders and consists of two components: (i) a private component, which is the cost of
fulfilling the contract ci drawn from distribution Fci (same as in gross auctions), and (ii) a
common component, the ticket revenues, R. In addition to the private value signal, firms receive
an additional signal ri drawn from Fr on the common value, i.e. the expected ticket revenues R.
Revenue signals, ri, are conditionally independent given R. Because of the additional revenue
component, the ex-post value of winning and the expected value of a bid is:
pii = R− ci + bi(3.4)
E[pii(b)|b, ci, ri] =




rj |ρi ≥ B−1j (b)
](1− F 1:N−1ρj (B−1j (b))(3.5)
Both, Fci and Fr, are assumed to be logconcave. From a theoretical perspective, this model is
a modified version of Goeree and Offerman (2003) which studies the symmetric case and the
extension by De Silva et al. (2003) which allows for asymmetric private-value distributions.
We employ a standard but important assumption: the common value component is given by
the weighted average of the signals received, i.e., R =
∑N
i=1 αiri. This assumption is crucial due
to the following reason: The strategic variable for a bidding firm is its bid, i.e. a scalar. However,
5Conditional Stochastic Dominance is defined as follows: There exists λ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ [cj,L, ci,H ] such that
1− Fi(x) = λ(1− Fj(x)) for all x ∈ [γ, cj,H ] and ddx 1−Fi(x)1−Fj(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [cj,L, γ].
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the valuation for the success is two-dimensional, consisting of the private and common value
component. There is typically no straightforward mapping from two-dimensional signals into a
one-dimensional variable. However, with the linear specification and logconcavity of the signal
distribution this is possible as shown in Goeree and Offerman (2003): the expected value of
winning can be rewritten as a linear composition of the private signals, ri and ci as ρi ≡ ci−αiri,
and terms independent of the private information. This scalar statistic is sufficient to capture
the private information in one dimension. Therefore, the standard auction theory methods as in
(Milgrom and Weber 1982) can be applied.
We extend the model of Goeree and Offerman (2003) and its extension in De Silva et al. (2003)
by allowing for asymmetries not only in the private value component and but also in the common




i=1 αi = 1. While every firm draws its signal ri
from the same distribution, the asymmetry between incumbent and entrants is captured by αi.
We denote the incumbent’s and entrants’ weights by αI and αE , respectively. Intuitively, αi
measures informational value of a bidder’s signal. A higher αi indicates a more reliable revenue




i σr and conditional on a signal ri, we get:
E[R|ri = r] = αir +
∑
j 6=i




due to independence of the revenue signals {rj}Nj=1, the variance is given by:




As αi = αE for all entrants and αi = αI for the incumbent, we get:
var[R|rE = r] = ((N − 2)α2E + α2I)σr for the entrant(3.6)
var[R|rI = r] = (N − 1)α2Eσr for the incumbent(3.7)
and hence var[R|rE = r] > var[R|rI = r] if αI > αE . Note that the vector α = (αI , αE)
effectively consists only of one parameter since we can normalize αI + (N − 1)αE = 1. For now,
we assume that the asymmetry is constant across all auctions.6
A bidder maximizes expected utility conditional on the observed signals. The structure of
the common component allows us to write this as αiri − ci + bi +
∑
j 6=i αjrj where the last
term is independent of the own signals. We can summarize the bidder’s private information as
ρi = ci − αiri which should be interpreted as a net cost signal or negative profitability signal.
Bidding behavior is described by a system of differential equations as derived in the following
Lemma. The standard derivation is carried out in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.2. The following system of differential equations constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilib-
6At the expense of having to estimate additional parameters, we can model σr and α as a function of track
characteristics X.
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rium of the first-price auction with asymmetric cost distribution and asymmetric signal precision:
b =




rj |ρi = B−1j (b)













ρ denote the density and distribution function of the first-order statistic
of other players’ signals. B−1j (·) denotes the inverse bid function of bidder j.
The intuition is analogous to bidding in the gross auction. Players bid their expected valuation
of winning the auction plus a bid-shading term. However, in the net auction case the expected
valuation also depends on the other players’ revenue signals. Because this is a common value
setting, the bidder faces a winner’s curse motif. This can be seen in the conditioning set of the
expectation of the other players’ revenue signals E
[
rj |ρi = B−1j (b)
]
. If bidder i wins with bid b,
then it must be the case that other players’ signals were not too good. Hence, when computing
that expectation, the player has to take that into account.
While theory gives strong predictions about how winning bids by the incumbent and the
entrants compare in private value auctions, this is much less clear in net contracts because of
the additional common revenue component. Especially if the revenue signal firms receive have
asymmetric precision. We give an intuition on the effect of the common value asymmetry in the
following Lemma that assumes a symmetric and known cost component.
Lemma 3.3. Assume there are two firms that have the same cost c. Then, if α1 > α2 and the
distributions of the compound common value signals αiri satisfy conditional stochastic dominance,
bidder 2 shades her bid more than bidder 1.
Lemma 3.3 shows that a less precisely informed bidder is affected more by the winner’s curse
and will shade its equilibrium bid more than a more precisely informed bidder.
In our setting, allowing for both asymmetries, there are two effects in place that determine
bidding behavior: (i) one bidderis (potentially) more efficient than the other bidders on average.
Hence, the less efficient bidders bid more aggressively than the more efficient bidder. (ii) One
bidder is (potentially) more precisely informed about the common value component. This implies
that the less informed bidders shade their bid more than the more informed bidder due to a
stronger winner’s curse effect. Taken together, the effects work can amplify each other or work
against each other depending on the identity of the advantages.
In particular, each of the asymmetries can be a source of inefficiency in the auction. If the
bidders are symmetric in the common value component, but one bidder is on average more
efficient than the competitors, these bid more aggressive. Hence, the auction outcome may
be inefficient, when the efficient realized cost advantage is not too big. If the bidders’ private
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value distributions are symmetric, but their common value signals asymmetrically precise, the
auction may be inefficient as well due to an asymmetric winner’s curse effect. If the less precisely
informed bidder draws a lower cost but both the same common value signal, she wins the auction
only if the cost advantage is sufficiently big, because she shades her bid more than the competitor.
If both asymmetries are present, there are two possibilities: (i) The more efficient bidder is
also more precisely informed. In this case, the more aggressive bidding by the disadvantaged
bidder due to the weaker private value distribution is mitigated by the stronger winner’s curse
effect. (ii) The more efficient bidder is less precisely informed. In this case, the less aggressive
bidding by the stronger bidder is amplified due to the winner’s curse effect. This is illustrated
in Section 3.2.
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3.3 Application: Short Haul Railway Passenger Services in Germany
3.3.1 Industry description
As many other industries, the German railway sector was liberalized in the 1990s. This
liberalization followed the EU Directive 91/440 Development of the community’s railways
implemented through the Eisenbahnneuverordnungsgesetz in 1993. One of the main objectives
was to induce competition in the railway sector. Towards this, the regionalisation was carried
out. Short hail railway passenger services are part of the universal service obligation and not
profitable for operators. Therefore, procurement agencies on behalf of the federal states were
assigned the task to choose an operator that provides this service. As these services require high
subsidies (around 7 billion EUR in 2016, Monopolkommission (2015)), the procurement agencies
aim at competition for the tracks to keep the required subsidies at a low level.
In another part of the reform, the former state monopolist Deutsche Bundesbahn in West
Germany and Deutsche Reichsbahn in East Germany merged into Deutsche Bahn AG which
is still publicly owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. As a consequence, entrants into
the market for German SRPS compete with a publicly held operator, Deutsche Bahn AG (DB),
that formerly was the state monpolist.
When procuring these services, the procurement agencies have a high degree of freedom in
designing the contract as well as the rules of the awarding. The agencies specifies the basic
components of the contract: for example, how frequent a company has to run services on a
certain line, the duration of the contract and the type of vehicles to be used. One important
additional feature is that it also chooses who obtains the ticket revenues, the agency itself or
the train-operating company. When the agency receives ticket revenues the contract is called a
gross contract, while the contract is called a net contract, when the operating company receives
the ticket revenues.
While the market share of competitors has been rising over the years since the liberalization, in
2013 DB still had a market share of 73.6% measured in train-kilometers (see Monopolkommission
(2015)). This raised a debate about the underlying reasons: are features in the procurement
process reinforcing the dominance of DB or is it due to DB being the efficient firm in the market?
We assess this question in the empirical implementation of our auction model.
3.3.2 Data description
Our data set consists of (almost) all procurement contracts from the German market for SRPS
from 1995 to 2011. The data contain detailed information on the awarding procedure, contract
characteristics, the number of participating firms, the winning bid and the identity of the winning
firm. Table 3.1 displays an overview of our sample size for different subset of awardings. While
this data set contains relatively few observations, it is to our knowledge the most comprehensive
data set on the German market for SRPS out there and we plan to supplement it with the most
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Table 3.1: Number of observed train line awardings by winning firm and auction mode
Auctions gross contracts net contracts
Incumbent wins 22 39
Entrant wins 55 51∑
77 90
recent awardings from 2012-2016. Moreover, we collected data on demographic characteristics of
the track region and data on track access charges and frequency of service from the German
Federal Statistical Office and additional publicly available sources. Currently, the estimation of
gross (net) auctions is based on 77 (90) awardings respectively.
3.3.3 Relating the theory to the application
The procurement agencies choose, when procuring a contract, whether the agency or the operator
receives the ticket revenues. We assume that this choice is exogenous. In general, one might
be worried that these differences across gross auctions and net auctions are driven by selection
issues and endogenous procurement decisions by the agencies. This is a potential problem if
agencies decide the contract mode (net vs. gross) based on unobservable contract characteristics
that inherently favor either the incumbent or the entrants. We argue that the role of endogenous
contract mode is negligible in our application for two reasons. First, we do not find systematic
differences in the most important track characteristics across our two groups of auctions from
which we conclude that the two sets of tracks are very similar. Second and more importantly,
industry experts also proclaim that the main procurement features are mostly determined by
agency preferences that generally are orthogonal to the structural cost and revenue characteristics
of a track, cf. the extensive discussion in Bahn-Report (2007).
Theoretically, the difference between net and gross contracts is the presence of a common
value component, the ticket revenues. As most features of the contract that affect demand are
pre-specified by the agency, for example, the frequency of the service, the type of vehicle to be
used, we consider the demand to be a common value for all firms. Moreover, we consider the
costs to be a private value as the firms have different access to vehicles, funding opportunities,
and can apply different wages.7
While we expect entrants to be symmetric with respect to their cost distribution, we expect
the cost of DB to be potentially different from the entrants’ cost. First, DB owns a large pool
of vehicles that it can easily reuse for various services, entrants typically have to buy or lease
vehicles. The cost for vehicles is a significant component of the costs of serving a contract. Also,
DB is likely to have cheaper access to funds as a publicly held firm. Altogether, we expect DB
7There certainly are common components in the cost like electricity and infrastructure charges. However,
these can be anticipated by the firms in advance and involve relatively little uncertainty.
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to have a cost advantage.
In net auctions, there is additional uncertainty about future demand and therefore about
ticket revenues. Again, we expect systematic differences between DB and its competitors. DB
Regio (the branch of DB that operates in the SRPS sector) is vertically integrated with DB
Vertrieb GmbH. Most tickets - even when DB is not operating the track - are sold through
DB Vertrieb GmbH. Therefore, DB possesses an informational advantage about demand as
competitors cannot access the information that DB Vertrieb GmbH has (see Monopolkommission
(2015)).
Given these observations, we model gross auctions as an asymmetric independent private
value auction and net auctions as an auction with private and common values in which we allow
for asymmetries in the private value component and asymmetric precisions of the common value
signal.8
3.3.4 Reduced-form evidence and descriptive statistics
An analysis of the raw data provides support for our initial conjecture that DB has an informa-
tional advantage over its competitors. However, we do not find strong evidence that DB is more
cost-efficient than its competitors (in a conditional stochastic dominance sense). The theoretical
model predicts that if a bidder has a cost advantage over a competitor, than his bid distribution
is also shifted to the left. As a consequence, the winning bid of the more cost-efficient bidder
should be systematically lower than the winning bids of its competitors. If the common value
is added to the model and the precision of the common value signal is asymmetric, the model
predicts bids of the informationally disadvantaged bidder to be systematically higher, if the cost
are symmetric.
Figure 3.1 show that when entrants win with lower bids than DB in gross auctions, which
provides evidence that DB might not be more efficient than its competitors. Comparing the
winning bids in net auctions, the winning bids are closer for DB and the entrants. This is
partial evidence that the bid function of the entrants is stronger affected by the common value
component than the bid function of DB. Also, Hunold and Wolf (2013) show that DB wins
significantly more when the contract that is auctioned is a net and not a gross contract.
8The main criticism of the model by Goeree and Offerman (2003) is that the uncertainty about the common
value increases in the number of bidders N . We believe that is less of a concern for our model. First, we expect αI
to be much larger than the entrants’ αE . Since the incumbent bids in all auctions, variation in N across auctions
comes only from a different number of less informed entrants. Second, increased uncertainty about ticket revenues
could well be consistent with our data. Tracks that attract more bidders are usually contracts with a higher
expected profit, but higher expected profits usually come also with higher demand risk. While we are aware of
the shortcomings of this model, we believe it nevertheless provides a framework that fits our application well.
With a sufficiently large sample, we could avoid this problem, by simply estimating the asymmetry parameters
separately for each N .
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3.4 Identification & Estimation
3.4.1 Identification arguments
The cost distributions in an asymmetric IPV model are non-parametrically identified from the
winning bid, the number of bidders and the identity of the winner (Athey and Haile 2002).
In contrast, the non-parametric identification of a common value component is much more
complicated. Identification of the joint distribution of the common value and all the signals
requires observing the full bid distribution and either exogenous variation in the number of
bidders or the ex post value of the auctioned object. In principle, the realized ticket revenues are
observable. Unfortunately, currently we do not have access to it. Identification of just the joint
distribution of all common value signals fails if some bids are not observed. In principle, the full
bid distribution is recorded by the agencies. Unfortunately, we do not have access to these data
at this point. Therefore, we cannot provide a formal identification argument for our common
value component. Similarly to Hong and Shum (2002), we rely on an intuitive argument to
identify the distribution of the common value.
Intuitively, identification of the revenue risk parameters comes from comparing differences
between the incumbent’s and the entrants’ bidding strategies across gross and net auctions. Our
key idea is to compare similar tracks under different procurement mechanisms (net vs. gross).
Since the procurement mode is assumed to be orthogonal to unobserved contract characteristics,
any systematic difference in bidding behavior should be attributed to the revenue uncertainty
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in net auctions. In addition, we exploit some arguably mild functional form assumptions that
help us in identifying the common value component. For example, we assume independence of
bidders’ revenue signals instead of trying to identify their joint distribution from the data.
3.4.2 Estimation strategy
Our estimation proceeds in two steps. First, we estimate the asymmetric IPV model using
data on auctions of gross contracts. This allows us to compute the distribution of costs for a
track with given characteristics. Second, we estimate or model with private (cost) and common
value (ticket revenue) components using data on net auctions. Since we extrapolate the cost
distributions from the first step, we can isolate the effect of the common value signal in the
second step.
As in Athey et al. (2011) we assume that there are two types of bidders: DB as the incumbent
who participates in all auctions and N − 1 symmetric entrants. Asymmetry complicates the
estimation since in general the differential equations in the first order conditions do not have
a closed-form solution anymore. An additional complication is that under asymmetry the
markup term has to be computed for each bidder configuration, i.e. for each number of bidders,
separately.9 With a sufficiently large sample, we can follow the non-parametric approach of
Brendstrup and Paarsch (2003) who generalize Guerre et al. (2000) to asymmetric IPV auctions.
Since the total number of procured tracks is still relatively small, a fully non-parametric
estimation will be very imprecise. Therefore, we employ a parametric approach. As in Lalive
et al. (2015) and Athey et al. (2011), we assume that the bid functions G() follow a Weibull
distribution:








where λ and ν are the scale and shape parameters. Both vary across incumbent and entrants
and are modeled as a function of observed contract characteristics:




















where I and E denote the incumbent and entrants respectively. In order to keep the number of
parameters reasonably low, we include only the number of train kilometers and the infrastructure
access costs associated with using the corresponding track sections in the contract characteristics
9Campo et al. (2003) develop a non-parametric estimation technique that is appropriate for this setting.
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X. We believe, that the admission costs charged by DB Netz are a good proxy for the type of
track that is procured. Moreover, the total number of train kilometers is a good proxy for the
complexity of a project. Finally, we include the contract’s specified frequency-of-service as an
additional regressor as a proxy for demand conditions.10
Since we only observe the winning bids, our estimation relies on the first order statistic,
i.e. the lowest realization of N random variables where N − 1 bids are drawn from the entrants’
distribution and one is drawn from the incumbent’s distribution. With one incumbent and
N − 1 entrants, the density of the first order statistic conditional on the incumbent or an entrant
winning are given by (see Appendix XXX for the derivation):
h(x(1:N), I) = gI(x)(1−GE(x))N−1(3.10)
h(x(1:N), E) = (N − 1)gE(x)(1−GE(x))N−2(1−GI(x)).(3.11)





where bj denotes the winning bid in auction j and TG is the total number of gross auctions in
our sample. Given the estimated parameters of the bid distributions, we can back out the cost
distribution of each track with characteristics X by inverting bidders’ FOCs. Following Athey
et al. (2011), we compute the cost distribution for a given track without imposing any additional
parametric assumptions as follows:
1. Draw a pseudo-sample of bids for both incumbent and entrant from the estimated bid
distributions. GI(b|X,N) and GE(b|X,N).
2. The pseudo-sample of bids has to satisfy the the first-order conditions 3.13 and 3.14:
cˆI = bIi −







cˆE = bEi −







In our procurement application, the markup terms can be computed as follows:
Gˆ(bi) = GMi|Bi(bi|bi, X,N)
= Pr(min
j 6=i
Bj ≥ bi|bi, X,N)
= (1−GE(bi))N−2(1−GI(bi)) (for an entrant)
= (1−GE(bi))N−1 (for the incumbent)
(3.15)
10Experimenting with different regressors yields qualitatively similar results which are available upon request.
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where in the last 2 lines GE and GI denote the estimated bid distributions for incumbent
and entrants. Intuitively, Gˆ(bi) describes the CDF of the lowest rival bid evaluated at
the actual winning bid bi, i.e. conditioning on the event that bid bi was pivotal. The




= −(N − 1)(1−GE(bi|X,N))N−2gE(bi|X,N) (for the incumbent)
= −(N − 2)(1−GE(bi|X,N))N−3gE(bi|X,N)(1−GI(bi|X,N))
− gI(bi|X,N)(1−GE(bi|X,N))N−1 (for entrants)
(3.16)
3. This results in a pseudo-sample of cost realizations for each track. Now, kernel smoothing
treating cˆ as a draw from the cost distribution can be used to compute the cost distribution
non-parametrically.
Using the gross auction estimates, we can compute the cost distribution for each track and
each bidder type. In our second step we use these to extrapolate costs to the net auction
contracts. This allows us to focus on the effects of the common value signals on incumbent’s
and entrants’ bidding behavior.
Recall that we assume that firms receive a pair of signals (ci, ri) for private costs and common
revenues respectively. We assume that revenue signals ri are drawn from a logconcave distribution
F (R, σr) with mean R and variance σr. As discussed in Section 3.2 the structure of our net auction
model allows us to combine the two signals into one net cost signal: ρi = ci−αiri that completely
determines bidding behavior. Moreover, we denote the expected valuation of the contract




rj |ρi = B−1j (b)
]
given inverse bid functions B−1j . Then, according to Lemma 3.2 bidding behavior is determined
by the system
PI = bI − 1−G
I
M,B(b
I , bI , N)
gIM,B(b
I , bI , N)
(3.17)
PE = bE − 1−G
E
M,B(b
E , bE , N)
gEM,B(b
E , bE , N)
.(3.18)
Our goal in this section is to estimate the additional parameters contained in the common
value component. In particular, we are interested in the parameter vector α that describes the
different precision of the players’ information. Our net auction estimation proceeds in two steps:
1. Since we have relatively few observations, we continue to follow a parametric estimation
approach. We assume that bid functions follow a Weibull distribution whose parameters are
functions of track and contract characteristics (analogous to the gross auction estimation).
After having estimated the net bid function parameters, we can back out the combined
cost-revenue signal (net cost signal) P based on the first-order conditions 3.17.
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2. Afterwards, we can treat Pi as known and transform the sample of winning bids into a
sample of (winner’s) expected valuations given the winning bid b. Moreover, from the
gross auction step we know the cost distributions from which c is drawn. This allows us to
isolate the revenue signal part of P via





rj |ρi = B−1j (b)
]
(3.19)





rj |ρi = B−1j (b)
]
(3.20)
We know P from the first step and the distribution of c from the gross auction step.
Therefore, the LHS “is known” (in expectation). The distribution of the RHS is based on
r ∼ F (R, σr) and can be computed up to a vector of parameters (R, σ, α). Thus, we can
estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood.
Derivation of the conditional expectation. To carry out the second step, we need to compute
the conditional expectation in the expected valuation of winning the line with bid b. The
expectation term conditions on the bid being pivotal, i.e. ρi = B
−1
j (b). However, from the first
step we only know the compound expected valuation conditional on winning with bid b. As
a consequence, we have to decompose P i into ρi (i’s own signal) and the expectation about
rivals’ revenue signals. This is a non-trivial exercise as we have to do this consistently with
the first-order conditions for equilibrium bidding. We make use of the fact that in equilibrium
given the signal ρi, the conditional expectation term is a deterministic number. Intuitively, it
describes i’s expectation about the opponents’ revenue signal conditioning on the event that i
won with bid b and that b was a pivotal bid.
Given the first step of the estimation procedure we can compute for every winning bid bw the
corresponding (compound) signal that induces opponents to bid bw, i.e. the opponents’ signal
that makes bw pivotal. If i is the winning bidder, denote this signal by P¯−i(bw) and note that if
an entrant wins, this is immediately given by the winning P of this line for the other entrants.
For any arbitrary player −i this can be computed by inverting bidder −i’s bid function at the
observed winning bid:




This gives us for every line with corresponding winning bid a sample of N expected valuations
conditional on winning with a bid bw. These have to be consistent with each other due to the
following observation: In the expected value of i’s opponents’ signals, the conditional expectation
of i’s revenue signal appears again. Hence, we have for each auction N equations in N unknowns
conditional on the corresponding ρi. The equation system is given by assuming that i wins the
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auction with bid b





rj |P i = P¯j(b)
]
(for winner)(3.22)







(for N − 1 rival bidders)(3.23)
with P¯ i(b) = P i(b). This is a fixed-point problem in N unknowns conditional on a set of
parameters α,R, σr. These unknowns are the conditional expectations about the opponents’
revenue signals. P¯j(b) can be computed from our estimation in the first step. Then, the










which we can use to compute
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where the joint density f(cj , rj) = fc,j(cj)fr(rj(cj)) follows from the independence of the revenue
and cost signals. Then, applying (3.24) in (3.25) and using this in (3.22) delivers us a system of
N equations in N unknowns for any combination of parameters ρi, ci, αi for every i. However, as
entrants are symmetric this reduces to a two-dimensional system with unknowns XI and XE
11















































11XE and XI differ only in the composition of the firms over which the summation is taken.
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For now, we are only interested in the conditional expectation terms and hence, we can reduce
this system using Xi =
∑
j 6=i αjE[rj |P
j
(b) = Pj(b)] further to:











c− P¯E(b)− (N − 2)αEXE − αIXI
)
)fE,c(c)dc(3.29)























c− P¯I(b)− c− (N − 1)αEXE
)
)fI,c(c)dc.
This system can be solved (numerically) for (XI , XE) for any given set of parameters (α,R, σr)
using the estimated distributions fci from the gross auctions and the distributional assumptions
on fri being a truncated normal distribution with mean R, variance σr and truncation thresholds
r and r. Existence of a solution to the system follows directly from Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem as it is a continuous mapping from a convex and compact set to itself. Formally proving
uniqueness of the fixed point is much harder. Therefore, we rely on extensive robustness checks
in which we initiate the solver at different starting values to check that the results are likely to
constitute the unique fixed point.
Derivation of the Likelihood Function. Given the values of the conditional expectation terms,
XI , XE , for any vector of parameters (R, σr, α), we can construct a likelihood function from the
first-order conditions for equilibrium bidding using the estimated values P i:
PI = cI − αIrI − (N − 1)αEXE(R, σr, α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
EI
(3.32)
PE = cE − αErE − (N − 2)αEXE(R, σr, α)− αIXI(R, σr, α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
EE
(3.33)
where the left-hand side is the “dependent variable” P i that we back out in the first stage. The
right-hand side depends on the parameters (R, σr, α) and is the sum of two independent random
variables. We can compute their density using the convolution of their distributions. The pdf of
αiri is fαiri =
1
αi
N (ri/αi;R, σr, r, r). ci is distributed according to fc(ci). Hence, the density of





where x is the right-hand side of Equation (3.32).
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Finally to capture revenue heterogeneity across tracks, we model the mean of the revenue
distribution (R) as a function of the frequency of service and the total number of train kilometers
as a sufficient statistic for demand, so that R = γ0 + γ1fs + γ2tkm. Similarly, we model the
variance of the revenue signal distribution as a function of the contract length: σr = σ¯r + γ3cl.
In principle, one can also parametrize α in a variety of ways. For example, we could estimate
the asymmetry parameters as a continuous function of the number of bidders or a function of
time which would enable us to allow for entrants learning about the common value over time.
3.5 Estimation results
Table 3.5 displays the results for the estimation of bid functions in gross and net auctions for
the incumbent and the entrants. In a highly non-linear model it is difficult to interpret the
magnitude of the coefficients.12 Therefore, we focus on the shape of the implied bid functions
and cost distribution estimates. We provide graphs for bid functions and cost distributions for
both incumbent an entrant for several representative gross and net auction lines in Appendix
(3.8).
Generally bid functions in gross auctions are close for incumbent and entrants and entrants’
dominate the incumbent’s bid function in the lower tail. This is consistent with the theory
of asymmetric auctions which prescribes weaker bidders to bid more aggressively. Our cost
distribution estimates are mostly as expected: Generally, the incumbent’s cost distribution
dominates the entrants’ distribution, i.e. incumbents cost are shifted to the left. However, for
most lines this difference is smaller than what one would expect and on a several lines entrants
even seem to have a cost advantage.
When comparing a typical bid function in a gross auction with one in a net auctions, we find
striking differences. Overall, in net auctions the incumbent is much more aggressive compared
to the entrants. This is line with our theoretical model that prescribes that entrants who are at
a higher risk of the winner’s curse will shade their bids more.
Having estimated bidding behavior in both gross and net auctions allows us to predict firms’
hypothetical bids if net auction tracks would have been procured in a gross auction. Moving
from net to gross contracts makes the bidding functions for the two types much more similar and
often results in the familiar picture of the entrants bidding more aggressively than the incumbent
in the left tail of the distribution. Analogously, estimating the cost distributions associated with
our net contracts reveals positive but only small cost advantages for the incumbent.
Table 3.3 displays the estimation results for the revenue signal and asymmetry parameters. As
12One striking feature of our estimates are the high standard errors which are mostly due to our small sample
size. This problem is well-known in the literature and shared with many other studies estimating parametric
bid functions, for example Athey et al. (2011). One explanation is that the asymptotic MLE formula provides a
bad description of the behavior of the estimator in small finite samples. In future versions, we plan to compute
bootstrap standard errors instead of the currently provided asymptotic MLE standard errors.
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Table 3.2: Estimation results: Bid function parameters
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expected the expected revenue is increasing in the size of the contract with a highly significant
coefficient. The expected revenue is also increasing in the specified frequency of service although,
due to a high standard error, not significant. The variance of the revenue distribution is highly
significant and positive and, not surprisingly, increasing in the length of the contract.
Most importantly, our estimates for the asymmetry parameters reveal that the incumbent
has a substantial information advantage. In our main specification, we estimate αI separately
for auctions with 2 bidders and 3 or more bidders. For N = 2, we get an estimated αI2 of 0.62
implying αE2 = 0.38. Put differently, in auctions with only 2 bidders the incumbent typically
has almost 66% more information about the ticket revenues than an entrant. An even more
asymmetric pattern persists for auctions with more than 2 bidders. For example, in auctions




In this section, we consider a series of counterfactuals and analyze the effects of procurement
design on efficiency and agency revenues. First, we define an ex ante efficiency measure in
our setup and then compare the ex ante probability of selecting the efficient bidder for three
scenarios: first, the actual gross auction sample, second the actual net auction sample and
finally we analyze the efficiency effects of procuring the net auction sample as gross auctions.
Afterwards, we propose several additional counterfactuals for future research. In particular,
we plan to consider the symmetrization of the information between incumbent and entrants in





Consider bidder i winning with bid b resulting from cost realization c. The probability that
bidder i winning with bid b is the efficient bidder is given by
Pr(c ≤ min
j 6=i
cj |b ≤ min
j 6=i
bj).(3.35)
According to the definition of conditional probabilities this is given by
Pr(c ≤ min
j 6=i
cj |b ≤ min
j 6=i
bj) =
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj ∩ c ≤ minj 6=i cj)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj) .(3.36)
We can rewrite the second event in terms of the bids as follows: the cost c = b−1i (b) of bidder
i corresponding to the winning bid b is lower than the minimum cost of all opponents, minj 6=i cj ,
then, the every other bidder j has to have bid more than the bid that corresponds to the same
cost realization, i.e. bj(c) = bj(b
−1
i (b)). That is, the second event corresponds to the condition
bj ≥ bj(b−1i (b)) ∀j 6= i.(3.37)
Therefore, we get the new condition
Pr(c ≤ min
j 6=i
cj |b ≤ min
j 6=i
bj) =
Pr(b ≤ bj ∀j 6= i ∩ bj ≥ bj(b−1i (b)) ∀j 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj)(3.38)
that only depends on the bid functions. Note that if bidders were symmetric, the first event
trivially implies the second event and the ex ante probability of selecting the efficient bidder is
equal to one. We can rewrite this condition further to
Pr(c ≤ min
j 6=i
cj |b ≤ min
j 6=i
bj) =
Pr(bj ≥ b ∩ bj ≥ bj(b−1i (b)) ∀ 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj)(3.39)
=
Pr(bj ≥ max{b, bj(b−1i (b))} ∀j 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj) .(3.40)
The max operator can be solved for each of the bidders directly from the bid functions for each b.
Then, we can compute this probability directly from the bid functions estimated in the previous
sections. The denominator is again given by the first-order statistics of the bid functions.
What remains to be done is to aggregate over all possible cases that can occur: all winning
bids and the corresponding winner’s identity. Therefore, the ex ante probability of selecting the
efficient bidder is given by
∫ b
b
Pr(incumbent i wins with bid b)
Pr(bj ≥ b ∩ bj ≥ bj(b−1i (b)) ∀j 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj)(3.41)
+ Pr(entrant i wins with bid b)
Pr(bj ≥ b ∩ bj ≥ bj(b−1i (b)) ∀j 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj) dF (b)(3.42)
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where F (b) is the distribution of the winning bid. The probability of the incumbent and an
entrant winning given bid b is given by
Pr(incumbent wins with b) = Pr(incumbent bids b and all entrants bid be ≥ b)(3.43)
= gI(b)(1−GE(b))N−1(3.44)
Pr(incumbent wins with b) = Pr(an entrant bids b and all other bidders bid bi ≥ b)(3.45)
= (N − 1)gE(b)(1−GE(b))N−2(1−GI(b)).(3.46)
This yields the following ex ante probability of selecting the efficient bidder:
∫ b
b
gI(b)(1−GE(b))N−1 Pr(bj ≥ b ∩ bj ≥ bj(b
−1
i (b)) ∀j 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj) +(3.47)
(N − 1)gE(b)(1−GE(b))N−2(1−GI(b))Pr(bj ≥ b ∩ bj ≥ bj(b
−1
i (b)) ∀j 6= i)
Pr(b ≤ minj 6=i bj) db(3.48)
Table 3.4: Efficiency comparison for different auction formats
Gross Auctions Net Auctions Net → Gross
Pr(selecting efficient firm) 0.7984 0.6363 0.7528
Table 3.4 displays the computed probabilities of selecting the efficient firm for various pro-
curement modes. All auction modes are fairly efficient with average probabilities of selecting the
efficient firm between 64% and 80%. Our gross auction sample exhibits the highest efficiency
measure with an average probability of almost 80%. In contrast, the efficiency probability is
substantially lower in our net auction sample (around 64%). One interpretation of this large
difference is that the gross auction sample consists of lines that are somewhat easier to procure
efficiently than the lines in the net auction sample. However, the difference could also be a
direct effect of the different procurement modes. In order to investigate the latter effect, we
compute the counterfactual efficiency probability when procuring the net auction sample as
gross auctions.
We find a significant increase in the probability of selecting the efficient bidder (from 64% to
75%) brining the efficiency of the net auction sample almost to the efficiency level of the gross
auction sample. One take-away message from this exercise is that in our application, the asym-
metry introduced by potential cost asymmetries is relatively small compared to the inefficiency
introduced by asymmetric information about the common value. Our policy implications are
somewhat similar to the ones by Hong and Shum (2002): More competition, which is often put
forward as an argument for net auctions, need not always be desirable, especially if the winner’s
curse is strong. In our application, letting train operating companies bear the revenue risks can





Resulting subsidies While looking at efficiency probabilities is arguably the most important
property of an auction design, the procurer might also care about the expected subsidy to be
paid. Our estimates allow us to predict the subsidy that the agency has to pay to the winning
firm. Since we have estimated the bid functions for all bidder types and all auction formats, we
can compute the expected winning bid via:
∫ b
b
b(gI(b)(1−GI(b))N−1 + (N − 1)gE(b)(1−GE(b))N−2(1−GI(b))db.(3.49)
When comparing the expected subsidy from gross and net auctions it has to be kept in mind
that in gross auctions, the agency also obtains the ticket revenues and, therefore, this has to be
substracted from the subsidy paid to the winning firm.
Gross as net auctions A straightforward extension is to analyze the effects for efficiency and
revenues when procuring the gross auction sample as net auctions. In light of the above results
for procuring net as gross auctions, we expect average efficiency to decrease.
Eliminating the informational asymmetry Completely abandoning net contracts might not
be desirable. Therefore, we simulate how procurement outcomes would change if entrants and
incumbents had the same information on the common value component, i.e. if their revenue
signals have equal weight. In our setting this is done by setting αi equal for every firm and
appropriately adjusting the expected value of the signal. For example, one could simulate auction
outcomes when the entrants and incumbent become equally informed by setting αI = αE . This
will not affect the variance of the incumbent’s signal, but will decrease the uncertainty for the
entrants (see the theoretical discussion above). In practice, this could be easily achieved by
mandating the incumbent to share its information on ticket sales with the procurement agencies
and rival bidders. We expect that going all the way from net to gross auctions is not necessary
to increase the ex ante efficiency and suspect that information-symmetric net auctions could
well result in the highest efficiency probability.
3.7 Conclusion
We develop and study a model of procurement auctions that allows for asymmetries in the private
value component and asymmetrically precise information on the common value component.
Theory predicts that if a bidder is on average more efficient than his competitors, he will bid less
agressively while the less efficient bidders bid more aggressively. Moreover, if a bidder is more
precisely informed about the common value component, he is less affected by the winner’s curse
than the competitor and will shade his bid less than the competitors. Observing a dominant firm
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in the market can be explained by both asymmetries: the dominant firm can have on average
lower costs than the competitors or be more precisely informed both allowing it to submit on
average lower bids than the competitors.
We take this model to a data set on short haul railway passenger auctions in Germany. With
this data set we can disentangle the two asymmetries by making use of a variation in the contract
design: local state agencies that procure these services can choose who bears the revenue risk
from ticket sales. If the ticket revenues remain with the agency (gross contract) the auction
is a standard asymmetric independent private values auction. If the train operating company
is the claimant of the ticket revenues (net contract), the auction is one with a private value
(cost) as well as a common value (ticket revenues) component. In a first step, we estimate the
cost distributions of DB and the entrants from the winning bids in gross auctions. Given the
first-step results, differences in bidding behavior that are not explained by the differences in cost
distributions can be attributed to the common value component.
The results of our structural analysis show no systematic cost advantage of DB over its
rivals. Importantly, they are not as large as one may initially expect - under a pure private
value assumption - given DB’s dominance in the market for SRPS. The estimation of the
informational advantage over its competitors reveals that indeed in most auctions DB holds
significantly more precise information about future ticket revenues. This highlights the concerns
in Monopolkommission (2015) that DB’s dominance is at least partially due to its informational
advantage which may call for regulatory interventions that symmetrize the information across
the bidders. Alternatively, efficiency could be increased by awarding more gross contracts which
eliminates the common value component from the auction. We study this intervention in a
counterfactual analysis and find that entrants shade their bids less than in net contract auctions,





In this appendix, we provide bid functions and estimated cost distributions for several represen-
tative lines for both gross and net auctions.
3.8.1 Exemplary bid and cost distributions
Bid distributions in gross auctions
The following graphs display a comparison of incumbent and entrant bid functions for gross
auction, i.e. auctions in which the bidders do not face any revenue risk.
Figure 3.2: Bid distribution for gross auction line 18
















3 The Effect of Asymmetric Common Value Uncertainty in Procurement Auctions
Figure 3.3: Bid distribution in gross auction line 20












Comparison of bid distributions for contract20
Incumbent
Entrant
Figure 3.4: Bid distribution in gross auction line 27

















Estimated cost distributions in gross auctions
In this section, we graph our estimates of the cost distributions associated with the bid functions
provided in the previous section.
Figure 3.5: Cost distribution for gross auction line 18





Kernel density of incumbent costs for gross contract18





Kernel density of entrant costs for gross contract18
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Figure 3.6: Cost distribution for gross auction line 20





Kernel density of incumbent costs for gross contract20





Kernel density of entrant costs for gross contract20
Figure 3.7: Cost distribution for gross auction line 27





Kernel density of incumbent costs for gross contract27





Kernel density of entrant costs for gross contract27
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Bid distributions in net auctions
In this section, we provide graphs of bid functions for the incumbent and the entrants for several
representative net auctions, i.e. auctions in which the firm bears the revenue risk.
Figure 3.8: Bid distribution for net auction line 26
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Figure 3.9: Bid distribution for net auction line 46












Comparison of bid distributions for net contract46
Incumbent
Entrant
Figure 3.10: Bid distribution for net auction line 47

















Hypothetical bid distributions in net auctions
In this section, we display hypothetical bid functions for the three net auctions presented
previously. They illustrate how incumbent and entrant would have bid if the same train track
would have been awarded as a gross instead of a net contract.
Figure 3.11: Hypothetical bid distribution for net auction line 26
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Figure 3.12: Hypothetical bid distribution for net auction line 46












Hypothetical bid distributions for net contracts46
Incumbent
Entrant
Figure 3.13: Hypothetical bid distribution for net auction line 47

















Estimated cost distributions in net auctions
In this section, we present our estimates for the cost distributions for the three net auction
tracks displayed previously.
Figure 3.14: Cost distribution for net auction line 26





Kernel density of incumbent cost for net contract26





Kernel density of entrant cost for net contract26
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Figure 3.15: Cost distribution for net auction line 46





Kernel density of incumbent cost for net contract46





Kernel density of entrant cost for net contract46
Figure 3.16: Cost distribution for net auction line 47





Kernel density of incumbent cost for net contract47





Kernel density of entrant cost for net contract47
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3.8.2 Detailed estimation results
Table 3.5: Estimation results: bid functions in gross auctions
Point Estimates Standard Errors t-Statistics p-Values
λI0 0.8107 0.9570 0.8472 0.3969
λIX 2.5096 0.3706 6.7722 0.0000
0.0121 2.8902 0.0042 0.9966
0.8513 4.0425 0.2106 0.8332
λIN 0.1554 0.7100 0.2189 0.8267
λE0 2.2926 1.0765 2.1296 0.0332
λEX 2.8809 2.7107 1.0628 0.2879
-0.7412 10.5867 -0.0700 0.9442
-1.1131 11.1176 -0.1001 0.9203
λEN -0.3706 2.1102 -0.1756 0.8606
νI0 10.4298 0.3564 29.2657 0.0000
νIX 0.2138 4.3872 0.0487 0.9611
0.8138 31.6314 0.0257 0.9795
-13.2611 43.7319 -0.3032 0.7617
νIN -2.8742 13.3168 -0.2158 0.8291
νE0 -0.3185 6.2125 -0.0513 0.9591
νEX 0.1677 4.6607 0.0360 0.9713
1.1258 23.2194 0.0485 0.9613
2.0834 14.1552 0.1472 0.8830
νEN 0.6701 5.2758 0.1270 0.8989
.
3.8.3 Derivation of Likelihood Function.
The likelihood function derives from the first-order statistic of the winning bid. That is, the
probability that the outcome of the auction is that bidder U wins the auction with bid x given
the other bidders N . Introduce the following general notation for bidder type U given our






























Denote the density function of the first-order statistic of winning bid x from winner U given
number of bidders N by hU
b1:N
. In case the incumbent wins, the likelihood function is derived
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Table 3.6: Estimation results: bid functions in net auctions
Point Estimates Standard Errors t-Statistics p-Values
λI0 -1.5602 0.3893 -4.0082 0.0001
λIX 23.5199 29.2769 0.8034 0.4218
0.6044 5.0368 0.1200 0.9045
-2.9337 5.9271 -0.4950 0.6206
λIN 1.5298 2.2238 0.6879 0.4915
λE0 -3.2925 1.4675 -2.2437 0.0249
λEX 66.7781 100.6160 0.6637 0.5069
-3.2713 27.6500 -0.1183 0.9058
2.5225 11.1989 0.2252 0.8218
λEN 0.5490 2.8292 0.1941 0.8461
νI0 -2.8274 19.0483 -0.1484 0.8820
νIX -32.4191 74.5279 -0.4350 0.6636
-1.7658 42.4943 -0.0416 0.9669
18.7309 31.6825 0.5912 0.5544
νIN -0.4042 16.2532 -0.0249 0.9802
νE0 2.4473 13.6525 0.1793 0.8577
νEX -22.5005 64.9759 -0.3463 0.7291
4.1126 21.5850 0.1905 0.8489
-0.7447 36.1394 -0.0206 0.9836
νEN -0.7632 3.3997 -0.2245 0.8224
from
hIb1:N (x, I wins) = Pr(b
I = x, bE1 ≥ x, . . . , bEN−1 ≥ x)(3.53)
= Pr(bI = x) Pr(bE1 , . . . , bEN−1)(3.54)
= gI(x)(1−GE(x))N−1(3.55)
and for an entrant it is given by
hEb1:N (x, one E wins) = (N − 1) Pr(bEi = x, bEj 6=i > x, bI > x)(3.56)
= (N − 1) Pr(bEi = x) Pr(bEj 6=i > x, bI > x)(3.57)
= (N − 1)gE(x)(1−GE(x))N−2(1−GI(x))(3.58)
3.8.4 Proof of Lemma 3.2.
The expected payoff of winning with bid b given signal −ci + αiri is given by
(3.59) pii(b) =




rj |ρi ≥ B−1j (b)
](1− F 1:N−1ρj (B−1j (b))
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Table 3.7: Estimation results: asymmetry parameters in net auctions
Point estimates Standard errors t-statistics p-values
αI2 0.6224 0.0140 44.4813 0.0000
αI3+ 0.5480 0.1943 2.8213 0.0048
σr0 2.8665 0.2855 10.0403 0.0000
σr1 0.8292 0.1441 5.7530 0.0000
βR0 2.0355 1.5010 1.3561 0.1751
βR1 8.1742 6.0590 1.3491 0.1773
βR2 4.9362 0.7209 6.8476 0.0000
where F
1:N\i
ρj denotes the first-order statistic of opponents’ signals. The first-order condition
yields
0 = −




rj |ρi ≥ B−1j (b)
] f1:N\iρj (B−1j )(b)B′−1j (b)



















rj |ρi ≥ B−1j (b)
]))
0 = −




rj |ρi = B−1j (b)
] f1:N\iρj (B−1j )(b)B′−1j (b) + (1− F 1:N\ij (B−1j (b))).
3.8.5 Proof of Lemma 3.3.
We assume that both firms have the same cost level c. Thus, the auction is a pure common
value auction with asymmetric signal distributions and symmetric value functions. The signal of
firm i is xi = c−αiri where ri is independently and identically distributed according to a cdf Fr














.13 To simplify notation we write Fj for Fxj .
We now proceed by deriving the tying function for procurement auctions following the proof
in Parreiras (2006) for standard first-price common value auctions. The expected value of bidder
i conditional on winning with bid b given signal xi is given by∫ ∞
φj(b)
(b− xi − φj(b) + c) d(1− Fj(φj(b)))
13We cannot guarantee that conditional stochastic dominance is satisfied under our parametric assumptions.
However, conditional stochastic is sufficient but not necessary for the result in this Lemma to hold, while FOSD
is necessary.
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where φj(b) is the inverse bid function. As in Parreiras (2006), an equilibrium in monotone
strategies exists and therefore the derivate of the inverse bid function is differentiable almost
everywhere. Uniqueness of the equilibrium also follows as in Parreiras (2006). The first-order
condition implicitly characterizing the equilibrium is given by
1
φ˙j(b)
= (b− xi − φj(b) + c) fj(φj(b))
1− Fj(φj(b)) .(3.60)
Taking the ratio of the two first-order conditions and applying the function Q(φ1(b)) = φ2(b)
which has derivative Q˙(φ1(b)) =
φ˙2(b)
φ˙1(b)








with standard boundary condition Q(x) = x. The interpretation of function Q(x) is that it
gives the signal of player 2 that places the same bid as player 1 given signal x. Hence, when
Q(x) ≥ x, bidder 2 shades the bid more than player 1. Given the assumption of conditional
stochastic dominance, we have that Q˙(x)|Q(x)=x > 1. Moreover, whenever Q(x) approaches x,
that is, whenever similar signals yield similar bids, ˙Q(x) > 1 and pushes Q(x) above x. Formally,
limQ(x)↘x Q˙(x) > 1.
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4 Collaborating under Asymmetric Information
joint with Sinem Hidir
4.1 Introduction
Many work and research activities are carried out in teams and require uncertain time to be
completed. Since Holmstro¨m (1982), it is well known that partners in a team rely on their peers
when their reward depends on the output of the team and not on their individual effort. This is
the well-known freeriding result in collaboration games. The extent to which individuals can
rely on their peers depends, however, on the information they hold about their productivity. If a
player is aware that the others are not productive in completing the project, he can rely less on
their progress. If a player is aware that the others are very productive, he has stronger freeriding
incentives. However, partnerships are often formed in presence of incomplete information about
the ability of a partner. When collaborating, the progress of the project is informative about the
ability of the partners. Therefore, the players’ knowledge about their peers evolves over time.
A second aspect is that relationships and information about coworkers are typically not
symmetric. Asymmetries of contributors to a project are widely observed. In research, coauthors
form teams to write papers together to benefit from their joint effort. Although there may be
initial information about the coauthor’s ability, it might not be perfect information about the
productivity in the current project. In particular, there is likely to be little uncertainty about
an established researcher who has already published in the area of the project. However, there
is only limited information and therefore higher uncertainty about the ability of more junior
researchers. In firms, teams consist of several workers some of which have been present for many
years and have known ability while others have just recently joined the firm and coworkers are
therefore still uncertain about their ability.
We consider a setting in which a player of certain ability (senior) owns a project and forms a
partnership with a player of uncertain productivity (junior) to achieve a one time breakthrough
before a deadline. The junior knows his own as well as the other’s ability, while the senior only
knows his own ability. We study this dynamic collaboration game to understand the interaction
of dynamic freeriding and learning about the collaborators. With unobservable effort levels,
the senior cannot distinguish a productive but shirking junior from an unproductive junior if
the project does not progress. Hence, the absence of a success is inconclusive news for the
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senior: he adjusts his belief about the junior’s ability downwards and becomes more pessimistic.
Increasing pessimism implies that the senior’s freeriding incentives are decreasing over time and,
therefore, he will increase his effort over time. This, however, affects the junior’s incentive to
exert effort: if the senior is expected to exert more effort, he can freeride on this additional effort
and reduce his own. When the deadline for project completion approaches, both, the senior and
the productive junior, will increase their efforts. We show that the junior’s effort path can be
non-monotone over time: initially he exerts high effort because the effort increase due to the
more pessimistic senior in the future is discounted. When the time of high effort by the senior
approaches, the junior reduces his effort and freerides more. Finally, a deadline effect kicks in
and both players will increase their effort levels.
In equilibrium, as a consequence of the uncertainty of the senior, the junior benefits from higher
contributions of the senior. Considering the tradeoff before a team is built, the productive junior
would want the senior to be sufficiently optimistic to form a team with the junior. Conditional
on being in the team, the junior prefers the senior to be as pessimistic as possible. A more
pessimistic initial belief about the junior reduces the incentives of the senior to freeride at each
instant and therefore increases his total effort level. Taking this to the extreme, it would be
optimal not to tell workers that there are others working on the same project. By means of
numerical examples, we show that it can be beneficial from a planner’s perspective to keep the
senior uncertain about his collaborator. In particular, it can be better to draw a junior from a
distribution that has a positive probability of selecting an unproductive junior, than choosing
with certainty a productive junior. However, this logic ignores any form of synergies in the
player’s efforts and therefore, we plan to extend the model to allow for synergies. In a weaker
sense, higher effort levels can be obtained by changing the composition of groups in sequential
projects to reduce the information about the peers within the team.
Literature. Our paper contributes to the literature on dynamics in teams. While it relates
to the literature on team experimentation as in the seminal papers Bolton and Harris (1999)
and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005), learning in the present paper is not about the project’s
quality but rather about the productivity of the collaborators. The most closely related paper is
Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011) which studies a dynamic collaboration game in which both players
are productive but there is common uncertainty about the project’s feasibility. In the present
paper, effort is also unobservable but the uncertainty is about the value of the contribution of
one of the players. In contrast to Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011) this yields to asymmetric freeriding
incentives that change over time. Our paper is also related to Guo and Roesler (2016) who study
dynamic collaboration on a project of uncertain feasibility. In their paper, players can privately
learn that the project is of bad quality and therefore learn privately the value of their effort.
However, as learning is about the project quality, there is no asymmetry in the benefit of effort
by each player but on the private belief about the benefit of individual and collective effort.
Georgiadis (2014) considers a team problem without asymmetries across players. In his setting,
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the project progresses gradually at the rate of players’ effort levels. Gradual progress induces
efforts - in contrast to our setup - to be strategic complements instead of strategic substitutes
over time. All of these papers, including ours, relate to the large literature on moral hazard in
teams.1 In contrast to this older literature, we consider a stochastic production technology and
asymmetric information about the value of each player’s contributions to the team.
There is a small literature on static contribution games which addresses the question of the
effect of uncertainty on individual contributions, e.g. Sandler, Sterbenz and Posnett (1987),
Bramoull and Treich (2009) These papers show that uncertainty can increase efficiency. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to consider how dynamic freeriding, asymmetric
information about team members and learning interact.
Georgiadis (2015) studies the optimal composition and incentive contracts of a team. This is
an extension we are planning to consider in our model in the presence of asymmetric information
and efforts being strategic substitutes over time as in Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011).
4.2 Two-Period Example
To build intuition, consider first a two-period example in discrete time. There are two juniors,
a senior and a junior, i ∈ {s, j}, that collaborate in two periods, t ∈ {1, 2}. The project’s
success depends on the players’ effort levels, uit and their productivity. The junior can either
be productive or unproductive. If he is unproductive, his effort never increases the success
probability and therefore, this type never puts effort. The junior’s productivity is his private
information and the senior believes that the junior is productive with probability µ1 in period
t = 1. The success probability is given by the sum of the effort levels,
∑
i∈{s,j} uit. The effort
levels of the players are unobservable. Completing the project gives a payoff v to the players
and ends the game. Effort costs are quadratic, cu2it. Second stage payoffs are discounted at a
common factor δ ≤ 1.
The absence of a success makes the senior more pessimistic about the junior’s productivity. This
follows from the probability of not observing a success being higher if the junior’s productivity-
weighted effort is lower which is the case for the low productivity type. As effort levels are not
directly observed, players hold beliefs about the other player’s effort choices, uˆit. The expected
payoffs for the senior is given by





+δ(1− us1 − µ1uˆj1)
(








1See, for example, Holmstrom (1982), Legros and Matthews (1993), Strausz (1999).
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and for the junior by




+δ(1− uˆs1 − uj1)
(







Note that the first-stage actions affect the second stage through their effect on the belief. Bayes’
rule gives for the second period belief of the senior
µ2(uˆj1, uˆs1) =
(1− uˆj1 − us1)µ
1− µ1uˆj1 − us1(4.3)
which is (weakly) less than µ1. This depends on the senior’s beliefs about the junior’s effort and
off the equilibrium path this belief may be misspecified.
We solve for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. In equilibrium, the effort levels of
the players must be optimal given the beliefs and the expectation about the player’s choices.
Moreover, these expectations are correct; hence, uit = uˆit. Then, the first-order conditions in





In the last period, the junior’s chooses the same effort level which is the static optimum. In the
first stage, however, the first-order conditions deliver for the senior
∂V s
∂u1s




















and for the junior
∂V j
∂u1j



















We find that, due to the asymmetric information about the junior’s type, the senior puts in more
effort into the project in the first period because he fears that if no success is obtained in the
current period, he is more likely to face an unproductive junior. This difference in effort levels
increases the more pessimistic the senior is. In addition to this effect of asymmetric information,
there is the standard procrastination effect:2 The effort level in period one is lower than the
static optimum which is equal to the effort level in the second period. One interesting feature is
2See Bonatti and Ho¨rner (2011).
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that compared to the full information case, the total effort is higher because the senior faces the
risk of working alone on the project.
It is evident that the junior benefits from the senior being more pessimistic about his type:
the more pessimistic the senior is, the more effort the senior will exert in the first period. A
two-period model does not suffice to analyze the effect of a potentially more pessimistic senior in
the future on the incentives of the junior today. The junior knows that - if he exerts effort today
- with a positive probability he faces a more pessimistic senior tomorrow who will exert more
effort. This, however, reduces incentives to exert effort today in order to freeride on the higher
effort level of the senior tomorrow. To address these dynamics, we consider a continuous-time
model in the following sections.
4.3 Model
We study a dynamic collaboration game under asymmetric information. There are two players,
i ∈ {s, j}, a senior and a junior. They collaborate in continuous time, t ∈ [0, T ], to complete
a project before a deadline T . The probability that the project is completed in time interval
[t, t+ dt) depends on the players’ unobserved effort levels uωi,t and their ability λiω. While the
senior’s productivity is known to be λs = 1, the junior’s productivity is private information and
λω ∈ {λh, λl}. The senior’s intial belief about the junior being of high productivity is denoted
by µ0. Given a player’s identity and type, the instantaneuous success probability of a success is
given by
∑
i∈{s,j} uitλiω. In the absence of a success, the senior’s belief evolves according to the
following differential equation
µ˙t = −µt(1− µt)(uˆhjtλjh − uˆljtλjl).(4.9)
where uˆωjt refers to the senior’s belief about the junior’s unobserved effort choices.
If the project is completed, the senior receives value vs and the junior receives value vj . If
the project is not completed before the deadline, both players receive a value of zero. In the
current version, we restrict attention to the case where only the high productivity type of the
junior member of the team can succeed. Hence, we assume that λjh > λjl = 0. This implies that
the unproductive type of the junior will never exert effort, uljt = 0. We simplify notation and
write uhjt = ujt and can neglect the unproductive junior’s problem in the analysis as it becomes
trivial. As a consequence, when we refer to the junior, the productive type of the junior is meant.
Moreover, we normalize the productivities to be equal to 1 λs = λjh = 1. We assume that effort
cost are convex with ciu
2
it for player i ∈ {s, j}. Both players discount the future at the common
discount rate r.
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e−rt Pr(no success before t) (Pr(success at t)vs − cost of effort) dt.(4.10)
The probability that no success has been obtained before time t is given by e−
∫ t
0 (usτ+ujτ )dτ
from the productive junior’s perspective. The senior only holds a belief about the junior’s type.
Therefore, from his perspective, the probability that no success has been obtained before time
t is given by e−
∫ t
0 (usτ+µτujτ )dτ . The probability of obtaining a success in [t, t+ dt) is given by
(ust + ujt) from the junior’s perspective and (ust + µtujt) from the senior’s perspective. Denote






























The players maximize their total discounted payoff, that is they choose an effort path {uit}t≥0
to maximize their objective function.
4.4 Analysis
4.4.1 Complete-Information Benchmark
As a benchmark, we consider first the outcome under complete information. In this case, the
senior knows whether he is working by himself (i.e. that the junior team member is unproductive)
or whether he is working together with a productive junior team member.
Cooperative Solution. To build a first intuition, suppose that both players were to cooperatively
maximize their payoffs. If the junior is unproductive, there is only one active player and the
cooperative solution coincides with the noncooperative solution in Lemma 2. If the junior is
productive, both players exert effort to maximize the sum of their payoffs. The following Lemma
describes the equilibrium behavior in this case.
Lemma 4.1. The cooperative solution is given by the following systems of differential equations
















We find that even in the cooperative solution players do not perfectly smooth their effort over
time as might be expected with convex costs. The delay of effort can be understood as follows:3
The success time given total effort is an exponentially distributed random variable. However, ex
ante players are uncertain about the realization of this random variable and it might very well
be possible that a low effort level generates a success. Hence, players initially exert low effort
to save effort cost with a positive probability. As time passes without a success, player update
their beliefs such that it is more likely that the realization of the random variable is high. As a
result, they have to increase their effort levels due to the approaching deadline. This effect is
present in all the variants of the model that we consider.
Noncooperative solution. Assume first that the senior knows that that the junior is unpro-








s − csu2t )dt.(4.13)
The senior’s incentives in this case are driven by an incentive to smooth effort over time due to
the convexity of cost, discounting and the option value of succeeding in the next instant.
Lemma 4.2. The senior’s effort path if he faces an unproductive junior is described by the
following differential equation







with boundary condition uT =
vs
cs .
The senior’s effort in this case is increasing over time until it hits the myopically optimal
effort level at the deadline. That effort is increasing over time is due to the reasons discussed in
the cooperative solution. Discounting reduces the incentive to delay effort and makes the effort
flatter. If the senior is fully myopic, he will choose ut =
vs
cs at each instant.
If the senior is certain to be collaborating with a productive junior, both players play a
dynamic contribution game. In this case, both solve a similar problem only being different in












In this case, there is an additional motif to procrastinate present. A success could also be
obtained by the other team member and a player could save his own cost of effort. The presence
of a team member therefore creates the familiar freeriding incentive.
3This logic has been presented in Kuelpmann (2016).
4Abusing notation we write ust = ut when there is no confusion.
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Lemma 4.3. Equilibrium effort levels in the complete information two player collaboration
game are described by the following differential equations with boundary conditions













We see that the senior’s effort level in this case is everywhere lower than if he is working
alone. This is driven by the opportunity to freeride on the productive junior. The senior has an
incentive to delay effort to potentially save on the cost of effort because the junior’s effort might
suffice to complete the project. Moreover, the effort is, exactly for the same reason, lower than
in the cooperative solution. If players maximize their payoffs cooperatively they internalize the
negative externality on the collaborator’s payoffs and hence do not freeride on their successes.
4.4.2 Asymmetric Information
In the case of asymmetric information the senior is not certain about the productivity of his
junior team member. However, he holds a belief about his productivity denoted by µt. As the
absence of a success is weak evidence for a low productivity junior, the belief is continuously
decreases when the project is not completed and the productive junior is expected to exert effort.
The belief follows the law of motion
µ˙t = −µt(1− µt)ujt.(4.16)
Note that the junior’s actions in the past determine the current belief of the senior and therefore
his current effort. The current effort of the senior, however, affects the junior’s choices today.
Hence, there is a non-trivial intertemporal linkage of the junior’s effort choices. The payoff of



























In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, both players maximize their payoffs given their conjectures
about the other player’s actions and the belief of the senior which is upated according to
Bayes rule. The following Proposition that describes the unique equilibrium is proved using
Pontryagin’s principle. The proof is carried out in the Appendix.
Proposition 4.1. The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game with asymmetric infor-
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium effort paths of Senior and Productive Junior. Parameter values: r =
0.2, vs = vj = 2.5, cs = 7, cs = 5, µ0 = 0.63, T = 10.
mation is described by the following system of differential equations with boundary conditions
























It follows from the Proposition that the uncertainty puts upward pressure on the senior’s
effort. That is, compared to full information, the effort path is flatter and the senior exerts more
effort. In return, this makes the junior’s effort path steeper and therefore reduces his effort.
Hence, the junior benefits from uncertainty while the senior suffers from uncertainty.
One interesting feature of the equilibrium is that the effort path of the junior can be non-
monotone while the senior’s effort is increasing over time as illustrated in Figure 1. In the
example of the figure, the productive junior is the more efficient contributor to the project
as his cost is lower. Therefore, he will exert more effort close to the deadline than the senior.
Initially, when the senior is still relatively optimistic, the junior exerts more effort than the
senior. However, the junior knows that the senior becomes increasingly pessimistic and therefore
will increase his effort. This increase in the senior’s effort reduces the junior’s incentives to exert
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effort today. Therefore, the junior’s effort can be decreasing when the discount factor is strictly
above zero. Without discounting, the junior will smooth the effort over time and not exert a
higher effort level initially because the senior’s high future effort is discounted.
The senior’s effort level increases if he is initially more pessimistic about the junior’s ability.
In return, the junior decreases his effort even further and has an increased freeriding incentive.
Hence, the junior benefits from a more pessimistic senior team member. That is, the junior
faces a ratchet effect-like incentive when entering the team: he wants the senior to be sufficiently
optimistic to have him in the project. However, conditional on being in the team, the junior
wants the senior to be pessimistic about his productivity.
In the case of a more productive junior, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, one can interpret the
equilibrium as follows: the senior, who has high effort cost, for example, due to opportunity cost,
lets the junior work on a project initially. However, if he does not observe progress, he becomes
more and more involved in the project to make up for the (in expectation) less productive junior
team member. This benefits the junior and he can reduce his effort in return and (partially)
freerides on the senior’s effort. As the project deadline approaches, both increase their efforts
substantially to complete the project.
We can show numerically that it can be beneficial for a social planner to select an unproduc-
tive junior to collaborate with the senior with positive probability compared to selecting an
unproductive junior always. This is exactly due to the reduced freeriding incentive of the senior
if he is uncertain about the junior’s productivity.
Both Players Uninformed. If both players are uninformed about their types a similar intuition
as before now also applies to the junior team member. With some, and over time increasing,
probability he is facing an unproductive senior. Therefore, his freeriding incentives are reduced
an he puts in more effort than under certainty.
Lemma 4.4. The equilibrium when both players are uninformed about their team member’s
ability is defined by the following system of differential equations together with boundary conditions

























Hence, also the senior member benefits from keeping the junior uninformed about his type
because this reduces freeriding incentives.
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4.4.3 Implications of the Different Information Structures
The previous subsections have shown that the player whose identity is unknown benefits from this
asymmetric information. This is because in the presence of perfect information his collaborator
has an incentive to freeride on his effort. However, if the uninformed player is uncertain whether
he faces a productive team member, his freeriding incentive is reduced and he exerts more effort
himself.
It follows that to maximize overall effort it is optimal to have two players that believe to be
working by themselves to complete the project. In this case, they do not freeride on the other
collaborator’s effort and will therefore behave as if they were working by themselves. Hence, in
this model, uncertainty about team members can actually be welfare enhancing.
4.5 Discussion
In addition to the results that have already been established, there are multiple interesting ways
to extend the setup.
Deciding on a Collaboration and Delegation. It seems natural to consider a situation in
which the senior can decide whether to start a collaboration, to delegate the project to a junior
or to leave the relationship when he gets too pessimistic. We plan to carry out these comparisons
and give conditions under which each of these scenarios is optimal. The value of delegating the
task to the junior is that the junior cannot freeride on a pessimistic senior and will therefore
increase the own effort. However, this comes at the cost of reducing the total potential effort.
The value of working alone can be that the benefits of the project do not have to be shared with
the junior.
Continuing Relationships. In the current setup there is no value for the senior of learning the
junior’s type because the game ends after a success. However, it might be that players work
on sequential projects. This introduces additional incentives to learn about the junior’s type,
for example, by delegating one task with a deadline to learn his type. As successes do not
perfectly reveal the junior’s type, the junior faces the tradeoff to choose his actions in a way to
keep the senior sufficiently optimistic to continue collaborating with him, while conditional on
continuation he wants him to be more pessimistic so that he exerts more effort.
Collaboration Design. Similar to Georgiadis (2015) it would be interesting to study the optimal
contract design from the senior’s point of view. He could determine a value-sharing rule as
function of the success time. Also, the optimal composition of a team with multiple members
would be an interesting variant of the model. So far, we have assumed that the low productivity
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type of the junior never exerts effort. However, if he would, the senior might be able to screen
juniors with different sharing rules and deadlines as in Halac, Kartik and Liu (2016) which
studies a principal-agent experimentation problem with adverse selection.
Additional Signal Technology. We are considering a very special learning technology. However,
in practice, workers have multiple ways to learn about a collaborator through unrelated work,
advise or potentially even breakdowns. We plan to consider the presence of non-terminal signals,
which can arrive as a result of effort throughout the project and are informative about the
junior’s type. This would allow more active learning of the senior about the junior. One could
also consider this to be an additional effort investment. The senior’s incentives to invest into
active learning might be changing over time with limited resources: initially, he is more optimistic
and can prevent exerting high effort at low beliefs by investing early in the relationship. Later
in the relationship, when he is pessimistic and the deadline approaches, the opportunity cost of
investing into learning may become too high. Additionally, this may be a way for the junior to
signal his type if the senior can decide to leave the relationship. If the senior’s belief is very
low the junior might reduce his effort in the project and instead try to generate information to
prove his ability and make the senior stick with the team.
Synergies One important assumption in our model is that we do not allow for synergies in the
player’s efforts. This is realistic in many team settings. However, the interaction of synergies
with asymmetric information is not straightforward. If the senior believes to be interacting with
a high productivity junior, he will believe that his effort has a higher value due to the synergies.
In contrast, if he thinks that he is facing a low productivity worker, his effort is valuable due to
lower expected synergies. Hence, synergies may mitigate the effect of asymmetric information
on freeriding incentives and change the dynamics of the interaction.
4.6 Conclusion
Asymmetric information about the productivity of peers in a dynamic collaboration setting are
frequent. Often, the productivity of new team members is not known and there is only some
initial information about the new collaborator. However, if the partnership evolves, players learn
about their team members and may therefore adjust their actions to the new information.
We study a dynamic game between two players in which one player’s productivity is common
knowledge while the other player’s productivity is his private information. We show that the
asymmetric information affects the freeriding incentives of the players: the uninformed player
will increase his effort because he faces the risk of a low productivity collaborator. This in
turn increases the freeriding motif of the informed player. He knows that if the project is
not completed today that the uninformed player will be more pessimistic and therefore work
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harder tomorrow. Hence, the informed player has an incentive to reduce his effort. By means
of numerical examples we can show that introducing asymmetric information into a dynamic
partnership game can increase the overall ex ante expected effort levels by reducing freeriding
incentives.
103
4 Collaborating under Asymmetric Information
4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
The Hamiltonian is given by
HW = e−rte−Ut
(











+ ηt(ust + ujt)(4.19)
where, again, Ut =
∫ t
0 (usτ + ujτ )dτ . This gives the following necessary conditions






















This implies that ust =
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csujt Differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to time
delivers
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Now recall that uit =
c−i
ci
u−it. Applying this to the differential equations delivers
















4.7.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2









where U st ≡
∫ t












with boundary condition ξT = 0. The first-order conditon for effort is given by
−e−rte−Ust (vs − csust) = ξt(4.33)
Differentiating this with respect to time delivers
ξ˙t = −e−rt−Ust (r (vs − csust) + ust (vs − csust)− csu˙st)(4.34)











The boundary condition is given by usT =
vs
cs due to the transversality condition that ξT = 0.
4.7.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Consider the case when the senior and the productive junior work together and the senior knows











+ ηit(ust + ujt)(4.36)
where Ut ≡=
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Equating this with the co-state evolution gives the equilibrium










together with the boundary condition uiT =
vi
ci
following from the transversality condition
ηiT = 0.
4.7.4 Proof of Proposition 4.1












+ ηt(ust + ujt)(4.42)
denoting the state as follows Ut ≡
∫ t
0 (ujτ + usτ )dτ with law of motion U˙t = (ust + ujt).
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ln(1− µt) yields after using the formula for the posterior µt = µ0e
− ∫ t0 ujsds
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U j0 = 0, U
s
0 = 0(4.53)
ξjT = 0, ξ
s
T = 0.(4.54)






























−Ujt + 1− µ0)(vs − csust) + (ust + ujt)µ0e−U
j
t (vs − csust)(4.57)
+ust(1− µ0)(vs − csust)− (µ0e−U
j
t + 1− µ0)csu˙st
)
(4.58)
and after using (4.52)










Together with the boundary conditions U j0 = 0, U
s





cs equations (4.56) and
(4.59) constitute the equilibrium of the game.
The necessary conditions are also sufficient as the running costs are strictly concave in the
state variables Ut and weakly concave in the controls in both problems.
4.7.5 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Denote by µit the belief of player i about player −i’s productivity. The belief evolves as before
according to µ˙it = −µit(1− µit)u−it. Rewriting the objectives as in the proof for Proposition 1
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where the states are U it =
∫ t




0 u−iτdτ . The necessary conditions for player i






































U−i0 = 0, U
i
0 = 0(4.65)
ξ−iT = 0, ξ
i
T = 0.(4.66)
Again, we differentiate the first-order condition with respect to time and equate it with the law
for the co-state evolution to obtain the equilibrium
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